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INTRODUCTION
M ODERN habeas corpus law generally favors an idiom of individu-al rights,' but the Great Writ's central feature is judicial power.
Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Federal Constitution provides: "The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it." The Suspension Clause exhibits frustrating syntax that recognizes a
habeas privilege and a suspension power that are, at best, implied else-
where in the Federal Constitution.2 Assuming that the suspension power
and its limits arise under Article I, then what constitutional language re-
quires habeas process in the first place, and under what provision does
any non-suspension power to restrict habeas arise?
The key to answering these questions is to conceptualize "habeas" as
a form of Article III power belonging to judges, and not as some sort of
right. The "privilege" ensures that prisoners can ask judges to exercise
that power. Article III combines with the Suspension Clause to guaran-
tee habeas process and to specify the exclusive conditions by which
Congress may restrict it. This paper sets forth the two major principles
of what I call "Habeas Power Theory," and the ultimate conclusion that
Congress cannot restrict the prerogative of a federal judge to decide
whether federal custody is "lawful." By cohering the new writ history,
decisional law, and maxims of federal jurisdiction, I sketch a theory for
how judges ought to use habeas to test different forms of federal pow-
' See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3084 n.20 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (describing habeas as an individual
right); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 826 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court
confers a constitutional right to habeas corpus on alien enemies . . . ."); Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466, 477-78 (2004) (describing the Suspension Clause repeatedly as securing a "right"
to federal habeas review); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 311-12 (2001) (describing habeas
corpus as a "right" following immigration orders) (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229,
235 (1953)).
2 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 619-20 (1842) ("No express power is
given to Congress to secure this invaluable right in the non-enumerated cases, or to suspend
the writ in cases of rebellion or invasion. And yet it would be difficult to say ... that it ought
not to be deemed by necessary implication within the scope of the legislative power of Con-
gress." (emphasis added)).
3 By treating the power as vesting in judges, rather than in courts, the theory presented
herein remains consistent with the Madisonian Compromise (the rule that inferior Article III
courts are not mandatory) and with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803)
(ruling that Congress cannot accrete the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction). See infra
Section II.C.
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er-for immigration, military, and criminal custody. (For the reasons set
forth in Section III.D, I do not reach the issue of state detention.)
Prior to Boumediene v. Bush4-probably the most thorough habeas
decision in the United States Reports-the Supreme Court had suggest-
ed only indirectly that the Constitution guaranteed any habeas process at
all.5 In 2008, however, Boumediene formally held that the Federal Con-
stitution requires habeas to be available to prisoners at the U.S. military
base in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba ("GTMO"). The Court failed to specify,
with any consistency, exactly which constitutional provision required
habeas access for GTMO detainees,' and it made little attempt to reduce
the military-detention rule to a more general principle of custodial re-
view. Conceptualizing habeas process as an Article III power at least
partially addresses both of those issues.
Before formally stating the two principles comprising my Habeas
Power Theory, a short digression on nomenclature is in order.
Boumediene describes statutory restrictions that disrupt steady-state ha-
beas access as "unconstitutional suspensions.' 8 The term "unconstitu-
tional suspension," however, is both unfortunate and revealing. The term
is unfortunate because the salient question involves what the habeas
privilege entails when Congress does not invoke its power to suspend.9
4 553 U.S. 723.
Compare, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 304 n.24 (observing in dicta that the Clause
was intended to preclude any possibility that congressional inaction would cause "the privi-
lege [to] be lost" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), with id. at 337 (Scal-
ia, J., dissenting) ("Indeed ... four of the state ratifying conventions [objected] that the Con-
stitution failed affirmatively to guarantee a right to habeas corpus."). See also Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807) ("[T]he power to award the writ by any of the
courts of the United States, must be given by written law.").
6 553 U.S. at 798; see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause Af-
ter Boumediene v. Bush, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 537, 538 (2010) ("Boumediene v. Bush is a cen-
tral pillar of constitutional law ... . because [it technically held] that Congress had violated
the Suspension Clause by denying someone an adequate judicial remedy for unlawful deten-
tion." (footnote omitted)).
The Court did hold that the Suspension Clause "has full effect at" GTMO. Boumediene,
553 U.S. at 771. That ruling only clarifies that the Suspension Clause contains limits that
extend to GTMO, and it does not isolate a constitutional provision that entitles the prisoners
to the writ in the first place.
8 See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733 ("Therefore § 7 of the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ." (internal citations omitted)).
9 See id. at 745 ("[The Suspension Clause] ensures that, except during periods of formal
suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the 'delicate
balance of governance' that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty." (citation omitted)); see
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The term is revealing because the Court anchored the rule against re-
stricting the privilege to Article I, Section 9, a section devoted to limits
on legislative power. The Supreme Court's language may be a clumsy
formulation of a more rigorously stated rule that Article I, Section 9 con-
tains the exclusive Congressional means to restrict habeas review of fed-
eral custody-formal suspension.10
That GTMO detainees must enjoy access to habeas process is a spe-
cific application of Habeas Power Theory. The Theory has two global
principles: (1) that the Constitution entitles all federal prisoners to some
quantum of habeas (or substitute) process before an Article III judge;"
and (2) that, absent a formal suspension, the Constitution does not per-
mit Congress to restrict judicial power to determine what constitutes
"lawful" custody. Boumediene was followed by a valuable burst of aca-
demic literature involving constitutionally-required habeas process for
military confinement,12 but there remains no broader theory of how ha-
beas power might apply to other forms of civil, criminal, administrative,
or military custody.13
also Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 Yale L.J. 600, 608 (2009)
(observing that Boumediene endorses a more robust view of the Suspension Clause).
10 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 1160 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler] ("[W]hether a
limitation on habeas jurisdiction ... constitutes a suspension is bound up with the question
of what scope of habeas corpus review is recognized by the Suspension Clause.").
" But see Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 383 (1977) (stating that, because non-Article
III judges could decide federal crimes, there need be no Article III adjudication of a habeas
claim).
12 See, e.g., Paul Diller, Habeas and (Non-)Delegation, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 585, 585 (2010)
(considering whether Boumediene can be justified as a non-delegation decision); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law
and Political Science, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 352, 352 (2010) (exploring how political science
can illuminate the Court's decision-making in War on Terror cases); Philip Hamburger, Be-
yond Protection, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1823, 1823 (2009) (discussing, among other things,
habeas process for foreign terrorists under American law); Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Cor-
pus, Suspension, and Guantinamo: The Boumediene Decision, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 59
(2008) (contending that Boumediene's ultimate impact will depend on how the administra-
tive process in which enemy classifications are made functions); Stephen I. Vladeck, The
New Habeas Revisionism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 966-78 (2011) (considering what
Boumediene and the historical scholarship on which it relies mean for military detainees at
GTMO and at other facilities).
13 Some articles do touch on how post-Boumediene habeas law might apply in other con-
texts. See, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan, Did the Madisonian Compromise Survive Detention at
Guantinamo?, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 535 (2010) (arguing that parts of Boumediene are in-
consistent with the Madisonian Compromise); Neuman, supra note 6, at 559-61 (2010) (set-
ting forth a theory of Boumediene's application to immigration proceedings, and briefly
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As a first step in explaining the Theory, I should disaggregate several
concepts that are improperly used as synonyms for a habeas corpus
power. Habeas authority actually involves: (1) power to entertain a pris-
oner's request that the court direct a habeas writ to a custodian (we
might think of the right to make the request as "the privilege" of habeas
corpus); (2) power to issue a habeas writ instructing a custodian to pro-
duce the prisoner and justify detention; (3) power to decide the lawful-
ness of custody; and (4) power to order discharge or set bail.14 When the
Court observes either that the Federal Constitution protects "the writ as
it existed in 1789" or that jurisdictional restrictions are constitutional if
they are "within the compass" of the writ's complex evolution,'" what
habeas powers is it even talking about? Moreover, if the second princi-
ple is that judges should decide how prior process proves that custody is
"lawful," then are legislative restrictions on post-conviction challenges
constitutional?
Part I provides a pre-Revolutionary writ history showing that, if
American habeas power over federal custody is restricted, then those re-
strictions do not derive from English common law. The habeas authority
of King's Bench (and other English judges) included each of the powers
specified above, along with the power to punish noncompliance with
contempt citations. Although habeas power was subject to statutory in-
novation, legislative developments were supplemental, not restrictive.
Even "suspension" statutes never curtailed all habeas power-English
suspension legislation usually combined a provision authorizing certain
custody with a provision stripping judges of discharge and bail-setting
power.16 A durable function of common-law habeas process was to al-
low judges to determine the extent to which a custodian over which a
court had personal jurisdiction could show lawfulness by proxy of prior
process. In fact, the authority of a judge to determine what counted as
mentioning some implications for post-conviction review); Stephen I. Viadeck,
Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 2107, 2115 (2009) (suggesting that Justice Kennedy's Boumediene opinion may be
explained as a response to the distinct injury to federal courts in denial-of-access cases).
4 See infra Section I.A.
"s INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("[A]t the absolute minimum, the Suspension
Clause protects the writ 'as it existed in 1789."' (footnote omitted)); Felker v. Turpin, 518
U.S. 651, 664 (1996) ("The added restrictions which the Act places on second habeas peti-
tions are well within the compass of this evolutionary process ....
16 See infra Section I.C.
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"lawful" custody was perhaps the signal feature of the habeas writ that
emerged from the seventeenth-century English Civil Wars.
In Part II, I make the normative argument,17 grounded in the structure
of federal jurisdiction, for the first principle of habeas power: that Arti-
cle I, Section 9 references a federal judicial authority to review federal
custody, and the only way the federal government may restrict that pow-
er is through formal suspension. The Supreme Court's two-century
struggle to define the inter-sovereign features of habeas power reflected
the Court's failure to distinguish the constituent elements of that authori-
ty. After Boumediene, however, theories that the Suspension Clause pro-
tects the authority of state judges to scrutinize federal custody have be-
come even more difficult to reconcile with constitutional text and the
structure of the habeas privilege.
In Part III, I present the normative argument in favor of the second
principle of habeas power: that Congress cannot strip jurisdiction of fed-
eral judges to decide how much process underlying a federal custody de-
termination proves that it is lawful. If a court has what we might think of
as personal jurisdiction over a custodian, then what we might think of as
subject matter jurisdiction necessarily includes power to entertain almost
all challenges to a criminal conviction. Proof of custodial process, in-
cluding a federal criminal conviction, is simply evidence of lawfulness.
Federal judges can develop legal rules that limit relief, but habeas re-
strictions may not be creatures of legislation.
The Habeas Power Theory is consistent with a muscular habeas writ,
but I do not envision unrestricted habeas access for federal prisoners.
My objection is to the institutional source of habeas restrictions, rather
than to restrictions per se. Habeas has always been an instrument of ju-
dicial power, and judges-not Congress-should dictate its limits.
Moreover, Congress should retain power to specify the substantive and
procedural terms of custody determinations, but it should not be able to
blunt the habeas remedy.
1 In using the term "normative" I do not mean to delve into the weightiest issues of legal
philosophy, nor to plumb the outer registers of Dworkinian theory. I use "normative" simply
to signal that I am prescribing rather than describing behavior. In this respect, my "norma-
tive" theory is uninteresting; judges should follow the legal-process norms of judging. They
should interpret authority in ways that are most consistent with other bodies of law, which
are in tum expressed in authoritative texts, judicial decisions, and accepted behavior. Those
interested in lengthy justifications for such a prescriptive approach should read Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L.
Rev. 1189 (1987).
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I. PARSING ENGLISH COMMON-LAW WRIT "JURISDICTION"
Boumediene reset the scholarly consensus the Supreme Court uses to
describe habeas practice in England and America before 1787.18 New
historical data drove Boumediene's result, 9 and it changes how we un-
derstand the relationship between Article III and the Suspension Clause.
The Clause bars suspension of the "privilege" of habeas writ, and I want
to focus on the judicial powers to which the privilege guarantees access.
Specifically, Part I conveys two ideas about the English common-law
writ, and each figures prominently in the normative positions I take in
Parts II and III.
First, habeas power at English common law actually subdivides into
at least four different types of judicial authority: to entertain petitions, to
send the writ, to adjudicate the lawfulness of custody, and to fashion ap-
propriate relief.20 A failure to parse habeas power obscures the distinc-
tion between features of judicial authority that Congress may restrict and
those that it may not.
Second, English judges used the habeas writ to consolidate power to
decide what counted as lawful custody throughout the Realm. 2' Whether
habeas corpus was described formally as a writ, a remedy, a right, or a
privilege, it served functionally as an instrument of English judicial
power. The defining feature of habeas power was that it allowed judg-
es-not legislators or monarchs-to determine how much custodial pro-
cess rendered detention lawful.22
Part I presents the historical backbone of my argument, but I am not
an originalist. I do not believe, for tough constitutional questions, that
1 Professor Paul D. Halliday is the academic most responsible for this work. See Paul D.
Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire (2010) [hereinafter Halliday]; Paul D.
Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and
American Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575 (2008) [hereinafter Halliday & White]. Professor
Halliday examined King's Bench files, rolls, and rulebooks every fourth year, from 1592 to
1708. See Halliday, supra, at 319. This process yielded data on 2757 prisoners. See id.
Boumediene relied on this survey heavily. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740, 747, 752 (citing
Halliday & White, supra).
19 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740, 747, 752 (citing Halliday & White, supra note 18).
20 See infra Section I.A.
21 See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
22 Cf. Lee Kovarsky, Custodial and Collateral Process: A Response to Professor Garrett,
98 Cornell L. Rev. Online 1 (2013), http://comell.1awreviewnetwork.com/files/2013/02/
Kovarskyformatted.pdf (explaining how the Supreme Court has contributed to the confusion
about which constitutional provisions require what kind of process).
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assessment of perfect historical data yields interpretive clarity.2 3 I Simplyjoin an emerging consensus that pre-Revolutionary English writ practice
does shed some interpretive light on questions for which the historical
record is robust.24 To the extent that the Federal Constitution adopted
features of the English writ, any serious discussion of the Suspension
Clause and its limits must recognize that central to the habeas power of a
sovereign's judges was the power to decide the lawfulness of that sover-
eign's custody. And the power to decide the lawfulness of custody in a
given case included the power to decide, more abstractly, what the con-
cept of lawful custody meant. I do not present evidence about the writ's
original function because the Court should always interpret the Federal
Constitution this way, but because many habeas decisions already do.25
A. Subdividing Habeas "Power"
Magna Carta pronounced that no person could be unlawfully impris-
oned,26 and habeas eventually developed into the primary security for
that decree.27 The early connection between Magna Carta and habeas
. 23 For many interpretive questions, the idea of original meaning is theoretically and practi-
cally unknowable. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Legislation and Statutory Interpreta-
tion 222 (2d ed. 2006); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533,
547-48 (1983); Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 145, 148 (2009); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 239, 249-50 (1992).
24 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 47,
60-63 (2012) (distinguishing, by reference to newly-available historical data, the concept of
habeas process from the process supporting the underlying custody order); Amanda L. Tyler,
The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 Hary. L. Rev. 901, 922-23
(2012) (arguing that clear evidence in the historical record should inform modern interpreta-
tion of the habeas privilege).
25 See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 ("But the analysis may begin with precedents as
of 1789, for the Court has said that 'at the absolute minimum' the Clause protects the writ as
it existed when the Constitution was drafted and ratified." (citation omitted)); INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("[A]t the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the
writ 'as it existed in 1789."' (citation omitted)); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64
(1996) ("But we assume, for purposes of decision here, that the Suspension Clause of the
Constitution refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789.").
26 See Ralph V. Turner, Magna Carta: Through the Ages 231 (2003).
27 See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *131 (stating that habeas corpus "run[s] into
all parts of the king's dominions: for the king is at all times entitled to have an account, why
the liberty of any of his subjects is restrained, wherever that restraint may be inflicted" (foot-
note omitted)); The Federalist No. 84, at 577 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (quoting William Blackstone's reference to habeas corpus as "the Bulwark of the Brit-
ish constitution"). There were actually different types of common-law habeas writ, but what
we refer to as modem habeas corpus is habeas corpus ad subjiciendum-the "Great Writ."
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process, however, is exaggerated.28 Until the seventeenth century, courts
used different types of habeas writs to move prisoners routinely through
courts and jails.2 9 The earliest common law habeas ad subjiciendum
writs allowed King's Bench, a judicial agent of the Crown (at which the
monarch was always technically deemed present), to review the custody
when a jailor detained a prisoner under color of the royal franchise (usu-
ally by a Justice of the Peace).30 For centuries after Magna Carta, habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum was more an instrument of Royal brand man-
agement than it was a font of individual liberty.
England did not hierarchically vest judicial power in a pyramid of na-
tional courts; different courts exercised varied territorial and subject
matter jurisdiction.31 Moreover, the jurisdiction of each tribunal was not
fixed: different courts used different devices to establish different au-
thority at different times. King's Bench was (along with the Courts of
Common Pleas and Exchequer) one of the three highest common-law
courts sitting at Westminster Hall.32 During the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, the Bench's workload and jurisdiction were threatened by the
Court of Chancery-and by the efficiency of the Chancery's equitable
process. To combat the insurgent jurisdiction of equity courts, the
Bench streamlined its process and adopted a series of reforms designed
to protect and expand its common-law authority.3 4 The Bench deployed
writs of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to aggrandize its power, using
the writ to decide the "lawfulness" of detentions ordered in matters oth-
erwise beyond its territorial or subject-matter jurisdiction.3 5 Custodians
See Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 Colum. L. Rev.
1533, 1535 (2007).
28 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 15; Daniel John Meador, Habeas Corpus and Magna Car-
ta: Dualism of Power and Liberty 5 (1966).
29 See R.J. Sharpe, The Law of Habeas Corpus 1-2 (1976).
30 See Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 Calif L. Rev. 1, 13
(2010).
31 See Blackstone, supra note 27, at *37-56, *68-70; 1 Sir William Holdsworth, A History
of English Law 194-264, 395-476 (7th ed. rev. 1956).
32 See Blackstone, supra note 27, at *41, *47, *56.
33 See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 47 (3d ed. 1990).
34 See id. at 48; see also 2 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 456 (4th ed.
1936) (observing that competition from chancery alerted "even the most conservative com-
mon lawyer to the necessity of endeavouring to meet [the] demands" of an evolving society).
35 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 9; Halliday & White, supra note 18, at 630; James E.
Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to
Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 899, 917-20 (1997).
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that did not comply with the writ were jailed or fined.36 By providing a
means to declare what custody was "lawful," habeas became an awe-
some instrument of judicial power. Any judicial officer could issue a
writ,37 but the degree of expected compliance was, unsurprisingly, di-
rectly proportional to the judicial officer's ability to enforce it.38 As a re-
sult, King's Bench justices, backed by Royal prerogative,39 deployed the
writ most extravagantly. 40 And they deployed it to custodians against
whom they could enforce the laws most effectively-namely, those over
whom the Bench had what we think of as personal jurisdiction.
When modem courts and theorists talk about habeas jurisdiction, they
could be talking about the judicial power to do several different types of
things: the power to entertain a habeas petition, the power to send a ha-
beas writ, the power to adjudicate the lawfulness of detention, and the
power to order relief from an unlawful detention. Collapsing those pow-
ers, which were distinct at English common law, confuses the question
as to which powers the American habeas privilege guarantees and which
ones Congress may restrict.
At this juncture, I should briefly describe the way habeas procedure
worked at English common law.4 1 After the Norman Conquest in 1066,
English courts began to use standard forms-writs-to order people to
appear in court or to do other things. English courts did not want to write
new writs every time someone asked for judicial process, so the courts
began to use standardized writs that naturally dictated the types of relief
that English subjects could request. Royal courts were not the only judi-
cial instrumentalities operating in English territory, and so a judicial writ
from a court exercising the Crown's power was considered a privilege of
English subjects. A habeas writ was a type of judicial order directed to
entities that exercised custody over a prisoner. A prisoner asked a court
36 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 11-14, 83.
3 For example, Barons of Exchequer and Justices in Common Pleas could issue the writ.
See Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 Yale L.J. 523, 525 n.7 (1923).
3 See Halliday & White, supra note 18, at 598 n.49.
3 The royal prerogative was a set of rights and authority that the Crown alone could exer-
cise and enjoy. Prerogative writs issued in the name of the monarch and to the Crown's
courts. 1 Blackstone, supra note 27, *245.
40 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 64-95 (explaining how King's Bench used the Crown's
prerogative to consolidate power over custody); Halliday & White, supra note 18, at 599
n.54.
4 1 For a more thorough explanation of the evolution of the habeas writ during this period,
see generally Brandon Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Habeas Corpus: Executive Detention and
Post-Conviction Litigation (forthcoming 2013).
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or judicial officer to issue a habeas writ by petitioning or otherwise ask-
ing for it, and a court or judge "sent" the writ to a custodian. The custo-
dian produced the prisoner and a "return" that would state the authority
under which the prisoner was detained. The judge or court to which the
habeas writ was returnable could then adjudicate the lawfulness of cus-
tody and, upon a finding that the custody was unlawful, fashion relief-
including orders that the prisoner be bailed or discharged. Above all, the
writ was adaptable, and judges developed procedures to pierce any ju-
risdictional formalities involved in the process just described.4 2
Petitioning for the Writ. By the start of the seventeenth century, the
habeas process began when the prisoner or someone acting on the pris-
oner's behalf would make a request, usually by affidavit, that the writ be
sent to the prisoner's custodian. The writ issued as a matter of discretion,
however, so the affidavit or other supporting material usually had to set
forth the merits of the cause before a judge or court would send it. At
least as early as the seventeenth century, judges began to use orders ni-
si-to show cause-in order to obtain the custodian's response before
deciding to send the writ.43
Sending the Writ. Upon good cause shown, an English judicial officer
then "sent" the habeas writ to a custodian, and the writ generally re-
quired the custodian to produce the prisoner in court, to state the cause
of detention, and sometimes-particularly after the November 1627
Case of the Five Knights discussed in Subsection I.B. 1-to provide the
cause of arrest. Along with the increasing focus on the cause for arrest
came a focus on the jurisdiction of any tribunal that ordered detention.4
The writ could be sent to courts, jailors, and other public officials; recip-
ients faced contempt for noncompliance.4 5
The Return to the Writ. The writ acted in personam on the jailor.46 It
specified a recipient who was required to submit a written return and to
produce the prisoner before a court or judge that could assess whether
the jailor was exercising lawful custody. Habeas writs were literally
pieces of paper, and so were the returns. The return might contain a jail-
42 See Diller, supra note 12, at 638 (describing habeas as a "protean" remedy).
43 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 112-13 (detailing nisi procedure in a variety of habeas
contexts); Kevin Costello, Habeas Corpus and Military and Naval Impressment, 1756-1816,
29 J. Legal Hist. 215, 216-18 (2008) (collecting rule nisi cases).
4 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 53.
45 See Halliday& White, supra note 18, at 599.
4 See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973).
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or's defense that common law, statute, or custom authorized the custo-
dy.4 7 An order of custody pursuant to a criminal judgment usually
proved that defense.
Disposition on Custody. Contrary to some accounts of common-law
habeas practice, the existence of a valid warrant in the return was not
enough to terminate the habeas inquiry--except in early cases of Crown-
ordered detention. 48 English judges frequently looked past the return to
scrutinize the legality of the substantive rule authorizing the detention.4 9
Bench justices often considered facts outside the return, notwithstanding
statutes arguably inconsistent with that practice.so English judges re-
lieved unlawful detention using bail or discharge orders, but they could
condition relief on almost anything." They infrequently awarded relief
to criminally-confined prisoners because, on most occasions and under
47 See Garrett, supra note 24, at 62.
48 Compare, e.g., Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Re-
view Reconsidered, 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1079, 1147 n.311 (1995) (restating a rule that
the "defendant" could not controvert facts in the return), with Halliday & White, supra note
18, at 610 ("In practice, however, justices of King's Bench often considered facts that had
not been asserted in the return, and even facts that appeared to contradict those in the return,
especially when doing so assisted the scrutiny of detentions the justices seem to have dis-
liked."). In Boumediene, the Court observed that "the black-letter rule that prisoners could
not controvert facts in the jailer's return was not [consistently] followed . . . in such cases."
553 U.S. at 780 (citations omitted); see also Halliday, supra note 18, at 107, 111, 117-19
(detailing case after case disproving the "rule" that facts in the return cannot be controvert-
ed).
49 See Halliday & White, supra note 18, at 610.
50 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2029, 2102 (2007) ("[C]ourts occasionally
permitted factual inquiries when no other opportunity for judicial review existed."); Eric M.
Freedman, Habeas Corpus in Three Dimensions: Dimension I: Habeas as a Common Law
Writ, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 591, 595 (2011) ("[J]udges routinely considered extrinsic
evidence such as in-court testimony, third party affidavits, documents, and expert opinions to
scrutinize the factual and legal basis for detention. Employing a variety of procedural devic-
es, they simply nullified the legalism that the custodian's return to a writ of habeas corpus
was conclusive as to the facts it contained." (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L.
Rev. 451, 457 (1966) ("[W]hen a prisoner applied for habeas corpus before indictment or
trial, some courts examined the written depositions . . . and others even heard oral testimony
to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to justify holding him for trial." (footnotes
omitted)); see also Halliday, supra note 18, at 111-12 ("[T]he return was not on record until
filed .... Until then, and even before the writ issued, anything might be done to adduce
facts .... The simplest way to explore all available facts . .. was to do so earlier in the pro-
cess.").
51 See David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82
Notre Dame L. Rev. 59, 87 (2006) (citing Blackstone, supra note 27, at * 134).
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then-prevailing legal norms, a conviction was sufficient to show prior
process that rendered custody lawful. There is no indication that Bench
justices lacked power to inspect the custody of a convicted inmate,52 and
there is no reason to believe other judges-limited by their ability to
punish noncompliance-fashioned some quasi-jurisdictional limit on re-
lief.
B. "Lawfulness" and Proof ofPrior Process
The fundamental use of habeas at English common law was as a
means to determine how much process in the underlying custody deter-
mination rendered it lawful." The writ evolved most rapidly towards an
instrument of judicial power during the bloody seventeenth-century Eng-
lish Civil Wars.5 4 Judicial power to decide what counted as lawful deten-
tion was not a collateral detail in this legal change; judicial power to de-
cide what lawful custody entailed was at the center of it. After a court
obtained personal jurisdiction over a custodian, the court decided what
lawful custody meant.
1. Judges Seizing the Prerogative
The fluid relationship between judges and sovereign power courses
through the Case of the Five Knights (sometimes called Darnel's
Case)-one of the more significant disputes in English legal history, de-
cided in 1627." Five Knights centered on a dispute over whether a
statement of Royal prerogative was sufficient to prove that custody was
lawful.56 Before the seventeenth century, habeas enabled judicial inquiry
into the cause of detention, which was considered to be distinct from the
cause of arrest. For that reason, a return indicating that the prisoner was
held on the Crown's instruction was sufficient to show the lawfulness of
detention. Judges could much more effectively pierce the Royal preroga-
tive if they could use habeas writs to demand that a custodian show
52 Cf. Halliday, supra note 18, at 308 ("[T]here had been little postconviction use of the
writ in felony. But the writ had always been at its most effective when judges used it to ad-
dress new problems.").
5 See id. at 7-8, 313-16; see also Garrett, supra note 24, at 57-63; Hamburger, supra note
12, at 1906-08.
54 See infra Subsection I.B.1.
ss See The Case of the Five Knights, (1627) 3 How. St. Tr. 1, 50 (K.B.).
56 See Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 1165, 1184 (2007).
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cause for arrest; judges could order the prisoner released for having
committed no specific legal wrong."
Five Knights was decided amidst military conflict and domestic polit-
ical strife. To finance unpopular wars against France and Spain, King
Charles I bypassed parliamentary funding and imprisoned various Eng-
lish subjects who refused to "repay" coerced Royal loans. The Privy
Council (the ancestor of the Cabinet) was the institution through which
Charles detained those subjects, and five imprisoned knights sought ha-
beas writs from King's Bench.59 The Conciliar return stated only that the
knights were detained "by his majesty's special commandment," and
provided no cause for the arrest.6 0 The Bench held that a habeas writ
commanding its recipient to disclose the cause of detention-which was
lawful if ordered by the Crown-did not imply an order to show the
cause of arrest.6' The idea that habeas bowed so easily to the Crown's
prerogative sparked public outrage, leading to two notable events in
1628. First, habeas writs sent from King's Bench began to instruct cus-
todians to show cause for the prisoner's arrest,62 which in turn allowed
judges to order relief in cases where cause was lacking. In other words,
judges increased the scope of review simply by placing more demands
in the writ. Second, Parliament passed and Charles I assented to the Peti-
tion of Right." The Petition of Right diminished the Royal prerogative,
decreeing that no prisoner could be held "contrary to the Lawes and
Franchise of the Land."65 These events accelerated the English struggle
over the writ and, by implication, the power to craft and decide what
constituted lawful custody under Magna Carta. These seventeenth-
5 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 49.
5 See Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 Va. L.
Rev. 1421, 1424-25 (1999).
5 See Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 259, 272
n.49 (2009).
6 See Eric Schnapper, The Parliament of Wonders, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1665, 1669 (1984)
(reviewing Commons Debates 1628 (Robert C. Johnson et al. eds., 1977)).
61 See Five Knights, 3 How. St. Tr. at 58-59.62 See James S. Hart, Jr., The Rule of Law, 1603-1660: Crowns, Courts and Judges 129-
30 (2003).
63 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 51.
6 See Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Car., c. 1, §§ 1-11 (Eng.); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S.
at 742 (explaining that the Petition of Right was a result of an "immediate outcry" over the
Five Knights case).
65 See Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Car., c. 1, §§ 1-11 (Eng).
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century struggles transformed the writ from a means of enforcing the
Crown's power into a judicial check on it.66
Charles I violated the Petition of Right almost immediately, and he
dissolved Parliament in 1629.67 During the decade that followed-the
"Personal Rule" or, less subtly, "The Eleven Years' Tyranny"-Charles
used the Royal prerogative to suppress religious minorities and political
opposition.8 To secure funding necessary to fend off the invading Scots,
he again consented to a reallocation of power in 1640. He ceded royal
authority to summon and dissolve Parliament,69 abolished the Star
Chamber,0 and agreed that habeas returns asserting the Crown's prerog-
ative specify the "true cause" of detention.7 Charles's 1649 regicide
marked the inception of the short-lived Commonwealth of England. Af-
ter Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell's death, Parliament restored Charles
II to the throne in 1660.72 Charles II had only illegitimate sons, and so
his brother, James II, Duke of York, was next in the line of royal succes-
sion. Parliament, concerned over James's Catholicism, enrolled several
bills seeking to prevent his ascension. To prevent passage of those bills,
Charles II dissolved Parliament four times between 1679 and 1681.
Many parliamentary allies opposing James's succession became (under-
standably) wary of the Crown's power to imprison political enemies.
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, largely the result of abusive civil de-
tention without bail, established new procedures for granting certain
types of habeas writs. In many respects, however, courts and theorists
have exaggerated the historical importance of the 1679 Act. 74 Most post-
1679 habeas writs sprung from authority at common law, not from the
66 See Robert S. Walker, The Constitutional and Legal Development of Habeas Corpus as
the Writ of Liberty 88 (1960); Meltzer, supra note 12, at 14 n.57; Morrison, supra note 27, at
1544.
67 See Esther S. Cope, Politics Without Parliaments, 1629-1640, at 11-12 (1987).
68 See Reinstein, supra note 59, at 272.
69 See Maurice Ashley, The English Civil War A Concise History 23-28 (1990).
70 See Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against
Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part II), 53 Ohio St.
L.J. 497, 541 (1992).
7 See Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and
Practice, 2 Harv. Nat'l Security J. 85, 114 (2011).
72 See John Witte, Jr., Prophets, Priests, and Kings: John Milton and the Reformation of
Riots and Liberties in England, 57 Emory L.J. 1527, 1535-36 (2008).
Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.).
74 See Halliday & White, supra note 18, at 612-13.
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statute. After 1679, however, the King and the Privy Council could
short-circuit statutory habeas process only if Parliament suspended the
writ.76 The first of many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century parliamen-
tary suspensions began a decade later.n
After Charles II died, James II assumed power in 1685. When James
II had a "legitimate" son--creating the prospect of a dynastic Catholic
reign-Protestant nobility invited William, Prince of Orange, to invade
England." James abdicated,7 9 and the Prince became King William III.
The "Glorious Revolution" culminated in the English Bill of Rights,o
which again reformulated English sovereign power. It required: (1) that
the Crown had to govern through consent of the people, as embodied by
Parliament; (2) that the Crown could not interfere with law; and (3) that
Roman Catholics could not sit on England's throne." While habeas cor-
pus both produced and reflected changes in the way English power was
redistributed during the seventeenth century, the common-law habeas
writ produced far more institutional change than was any remedy created
by Parliament. Specifically, the common-law writ was the means by
which judges redefined the concept of "lawful custody," making it a
more exacting requirement-necessitating that a jailor show more than
simply that a prisoner was detained at the Crown's request.
2. Attacks on Criminal Convictions
The notion that, at English common law, there was some jurisdiction-
al barrier to using habeas for post-conviction review is one of the most
7 The 1679 Act did not establish any new right, privilege, remedy, or other form of legal
entitlement. See Henry Hallam, The Constitutional History of England, 430-31 (9th ed.
1905); Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 555, 563 (2002). Moreover, courts continued to conduct inquiries
and grant relief in ways that the 1679 Act did not authorize. See Hallam, supra, at 431-32.
They did so pursuant to common-law writ authority. See id. at 432.
76 See Hamburger, supra note 12, at 1908-09. In 1689, the Declaration of Rights ended
royal power to suspend laws. See Declaration of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.).
7 See 17 Geo. 3, c. 9 (1777) (Eng.); 19 Geo. 2, c. 1 (1745) (Eng.); 17 Geo. 2, c. 6 (1744)
(Eng.); 9 Geo. 1, c. 1 (1722) (Eng.); 1 Geo. 1, c. 8 (1714) (Eng.); 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 11 (1696)
(Eng.); I W. & M., c. 19 (1688) (Eng.); 1 W. & M., cc. 2, 7 (1688) (Eng.).
78 See Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1385, 1413 (2004).
7 He fled to France; Parliament determined that he had abdicated for the purposes of de-
tennining the new king. See James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship,
1608-1870, at 169 (1978).
80 The Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (1688) (Eng.); see Witte, supra note 72, at 1536.
81 The Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (1688) (Eng.).
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pervasive falsehoods in the habeas literature. 82 This feat has been ac-
complished-most spectacularly by Chief Justice Marshall in Ex parte
Watkins83-by overstating the importance of the Habeas Corpus Act of
1679, which had language excluding convicted inmates from its cover-
age. 84 The common-law writ, however, was subject to no such limita-
tion.8 ' The historical evidence that the Supreme Court treated as authori-
tative in Boumediene punctures the enduring myth that English judges
did not use habeas writs to collaterally review criminal convictions.
Although habeas took center stage during the mid-seventeenth-
century conflict between King's Bench and the Crown, in an earlier age
it was used against local Justices of the Peace ("JPs"), to cure overzeal-
ous use of the summary conviction process and to void associated orders
to jail inmates.87 King's Bench used habeas to review numerous facets of
post-conviction imprisonment, both by JPs and by other courts, includ-
ing: the factual accuracy of the return; the authority of a convicting
court; the technicalities of a sentence; the findings pertaining to mental
health; the severity of noncapital sentences; and the presence of extenu-
ating circumstances. 8 Judges even used habeas to attach conditions to
sentences and pardons."
Habeas was particularly central to review of one type of conviction:
murder. King's Bench used the writ to reduce sentences for otherwise
wrongful deaths upon post-conviction showings of extenuating circum-
82 See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
8 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830). I discuss Watkins extensively in
Section III.B, infra.
84 See Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 202 ("[T]he celebrated habeas corpus act of the 31st of
Charles II was enacted, for the purpose of securing the benefits for which the writ was giv-
en. . . . It enforces the common law. This statute excepts from those who are entitled to its
benefit ... persons convicted or in execution. The exception of persons convicted applies
particularly to the application now under consideration.").
85 See infra notes 250-55 and accompanying text (explaining that Chief Justice Marshall
confused the 1679 Act's supplementary habeas provisions with limits on the common-law
writ).
86 See Vladeck, supra note 12, at 981 ("[Tlhe statutory writ was just one piece of the puz-
zle, and there was ample evidence that King's Bench could issue the common law writ to
consider the validity of convictions, whether by courts-martial or courts of record. Relying
solely on the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 provides a decidedly truncated lens through which
to examine English practice. Whether he misunderstood English history or misrepresented it,
Chief Justice Marshall thereby perpetuated a critically incorrect assumption about the scope
of common law habeas corpus at the Founding." (footnotes omitted)).
87 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 106-07, 117, 149.
88 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
89 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 118.
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stances.90 After conviction, it used habeas to police the distinction be-
tween murder and homicide.9' Moreover, much of this post-conviction
review was also post-judgment.92 The more questionable the process that
produced judgments of conviction, the more intense the habeas scrutiny
conducted by King's Bench.93 Although habeas review was most aggres-
sive for JP convictions and homicide offenses, King's Bench also used
the writ to conduct post-conviction review of a number of other crimes,
such as burglary and treason.94 By the outbreak of war in the American
colonies, the writ's most salient characteristic was that it could be used
to scrutinize detention of any form: criminal convictions, military im-
prisonment, naval impressment, slavery, and apprenticeship, to name a
few.95 Its function was to help judges decide how much and what kind of
custodial process produced lawful detention.
C Suspension
Even parliamentary suspension affected only the requirement that a
custodian respond to the writ and the power of judges to order bail or
discharge, and only for a specified time period. Nothing about judicial
activity during suspension suggests a limit on non-suspended habeas
power.
90 See id.
9' See id.
92 See Neuman, supra note 75, at 612 ("[Clommon law courts of general jurisdiction were
sparing in using [the habeas writ] against each other, particularly after judgment in a crimi-
nal case. Nonetheless, the common-law inheritance in 1789 included precedents in which it
had been used, and statements concerning when it might be used, that contradicted or quali-
fied other statements of its unavailability."); see also Halliday, supra note 18, at 119 ("Using
habeas corpus, King's Bench reviewed judgments and attached increasingly creative de-
mands to offers to reduce sentences, just as they did when offering bail prior to conviction."
(emphasis added)).
9 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 119-20 ("In summary process, there were no indict-
ments, no presentments, no pleadings, no juries: JPs' orders, by themselves, produced legal
convictions. Habeas corpus was the chief means for reviewing such summary convictions.
Summary conviction cases demonstrated how far the justices of King's Bench would go in
entering and monitoring another jurisdiction, especially the jurisdiction of these amateur
judfes.").9 See Rex v. Collyer, (1752) 96 Eng. Rep. 797 (K.B.) (granting habeas discharge after
conviction at quarter session, on the ground that the inmate could not remain "in prison un-
der the illegal parts of this judgment, until they can obtain a reversal of those parts upon a
writ of error"); Halliday, supra note 18, at 118-19.
9 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 120-21.
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By 1689, habeas procedure was a creature of both common law and
statute.96 Power to issue the writ could arise under either source,97 alt-
hough the common-law writ was by a wide margin the greater authority.
Because England had no written constitution, the pre-1679 restrictions
on suspension were rooted in norm and custom-not in positive law.
The Crown's suspension authority was one of the things that parliamen-
tary allies sought most aggressively to wrest from royal control, and, by
1689, Parliament had secured its own monopoly over the power.99 Par-
liament, however, was hardly judicious with suspension authority. It
suspended the writ three times that year, 00 and nine more times before
the outbreak of war in the American colonies. 101 For my purposes, the
types of practices the "suspension power" impaired and when it im-
paired them are important because the habeas powers that judges re-
tained during and after suspensions disclose much of what the steady-
state privilege entailed.
The formulism of pre-eighteenth century suspension statutes contrasts
starkly with the fluidity of habeas process. 0 2 First, even describing these
parliamentary enactments as "habeas suspension statutes" is a bit mis-
leading-not a single one of them used the terms "suspend" or "habeas
96 See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
9 See Robert Searles Walker, Habeas Corpus Writ of Liberty: English and American Ori-
gins and Development 107 (2006) (noting that, notwithstanding important statutes such as
Magna Carta and the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act, English law could not "point to a single, su-
preme originating instrument" that restricted parliamentary authority); Martin H. Redish &
Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process, and the Suspension Clause: A Study in
the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1361, 1368 (2010) ("Despite
the 'spiritual importance' of both the Magna Carta and the writ of habeas corpus to the foun-
dations of the unwritten British constitution, the documents' mandates ... were never
deemed legally binding on Parliament.").
98 See Shapiro, supra note 51, at 83; Tyler, supra note 9, at 616.
9 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1,
47, 49 (2001).
00 See 1 W. & M., c. 19 (1688) (Eng.); 1 W. & M., c. 7 (1688) (Eng.); 1 W. & M., c. 2
(1688) (Eng.).
1o1 See 20 Geo. 2, c. 1 (1747) (Eng.); 19 Geo. 2, c. 17 (1746) (Eng.); 19 Geo. 2, c. 1 (1746)
(Eng.); 17 Geo. 2, c. 6 (1744) (Eng.); 9 Geo. 1, c. 1 (1722) (Eng.); 1 Geo. 1, c. 30 (1715)
(Eng.); 1 Geo. 1, c. 8 (1714) (Eng.); 6 Ann., c. 15 (1707) (Eng.); 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 11 (1695-
1696) (Eng.).
102 See 34 Geo. 3, c. 54 (1794) (Eng.) (authorizing detention of certain persons "without
Bail or Mainprize, until the first Day of February one thousand seven hundred and ninety-
five"); A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 230 (10th ed.
1964) (noting that "every [suspension] has been an annual Act, and must, therefore, if it is to
continue in force, be renewed year by year").
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corpus." Instead, they created royal authority for the exercise of two fa-
miliar but conceptually distinct powers-to arrest and to detain. 10 3 The
statutes empowered the Crown to lawfully apprehend (arrest) and im-
prison without "bail or mainprize" (detain). Nothing in these acts actual-
ly interrupted the habeas "power" to hear a habeas motion, to issue a
writ, or to hear the cause upon the return. Certain officials did not have
to provide a return, and individuals for whom the Parliament suspended
the privilege would not be released, but judges could (and did) issue
common-law habeas writs for exercises of power beyond the statutory
authorization. 04
Second, the suspension statutes always specified a sunset date, and
the average duration of a suspension period was five months.'0o Each
suspension statute provided that, when it expired, subjects imprisoned
under the act would have the benefit of any law or statute providing for
their liberties.'06 This language restored all statutory procedure under the
1679 Habeas Act, as well as any common-law privileges that the sus-
pension acts might have diminished. By subjecting both the arrest and
the detention powers to sunset provisions, prisoners arrested pursuant to
the expanded suspension authority could still be discharged after the
suspension period lapsed.107
English suspension statutes applicable in American colonies were dif-
ferent from the seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century statutes used
to preserve the continuity of the English empire during its civil wars.
Most notably, the event necessitating the colonial suspension statute was
not a rebellion or invasion. The statute recited that it was "inconven-
103 See Tyler, supra note 9, at 665 ("One need only think back to the English suspensions
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the pre-Convention suspensions in the colo-
nies, which by their terms 'authorized and empowered' the executive to arrest and detain
certain classes of persons.").
104 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 249 (noting that judges sent common-law habeas writs
during periods of suspension); id. at 250 ("[T]he common law writ persisted throughout,
ready for use, at least on the king's behalf, even during suspensions.").10 Halliday & White, supra note 18, at 622.
106 See, e.g., 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 11 (1695-1696) (Eng.) ("Provided always, [t]hat from and
after the said [date the statute expired], the said Persons soe [sic] committed shall have the
Benefitt [sic] and Advantage of... [all] Laws and Statutes any way relating to or providing
for the Liberty of the Subjects of this Realme [sic] . .
107 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 250 (observing that Chief Justice Sir John Holt's court
released eighty percent of the prisoners brought before it in the period immediately follow-
ing the 1689 suspension, as well as all prisoners detained pursuant to conciliar warrant in the
period immediately following 1696 suspension: "[W]hen suspension ended, the writ sprang
immediately back to life, as usage on the first day of term after each suspension shows").
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ient ... to proceed . .. to the Trial of such Criminals, and at the same
Time of evil Example to suffer them to go at large."10 8 The Framers re-
sponded to that recitation pointedly, providing that the writ could not be
suspended except in times of rebellion or invasion.
Nothing about the statutory writ or the suspension power affected ha-
beas authority outside the suspension period. Even as to habeas authority
within that period, a suspension only (1) relieved custodians of the obli-
gation to provide a return to the writ in certain cases, and (2) curtailed
the habeas power of common-law judges to bail or discharge prisoners
to whom the suspension applied. To whatever extent America inherited
English writ law, that inheritance did not include anything like a juris-
dictional limit on the types of custody judges could review or on the
forms such review could take. Moreover, the most important feature of
the English common-law writ was that it allocated to judges the power
to decide what process rendered custody lawful.
II. PRINCIPLE 1: HABEAS AS FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER TO REVIEW
FEDERAL CUSTODY
Part I showed that courts and theorists should not treat modern habeas
restrictions as pond-hopping limits native to English common law. The
Framers, however, did not just adopt the English writ; they reconstituted
habeas process in a new constitutional environment of dual sovereignty,
separated powers, and limited judicial authority. Part II presents a struc-
tural argument in favor of the first principle of habeas power-that, in
the absence of suspension, Article III ensures federal habeas process for
federal prisoners. 109 Habeas power means a sovereign judicial officer's
authority to review custody pursuant to some other order of that same
sovereign."o
Part II responds to two theories that are inconsistent with the principle
that Article III vests and the Suspension Clause protects the power of a
108 17 Geo. 3, c. 9 (1777) (Eng.).
109 If the Federal Constitution guarantees any habeas access, the question of whether the
Suspension Clause would protect the power of state or of federal judicial officers is a "stand-
ard crux in the federal courts literature." Neuman, supra note 6, at 557. Much of my discus-
sion in Part II deals with the argument that the Suspension Clause might protect the authority
of state judges to grant habeas relief, particularly to federal prisoners.
110 If the Federal Constitution guarantees some habeas process in federal court for state
prisoners or in state court for federal prisoners, then that principle must arise under a combi-
nation of the Suspension Clause, Article III, and some other constitutional provision. See
infra Section III.D.
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federal judge to review federal custody. What I call the "Null Power
Hypothesis" is the idea that the Constitution guarantees no federal habe-
as power at all. What I call the "Inter-sovereign Habeas Hypothesis"
treats the Suspension Clause as a guarantee of state habeas power to
considerfederal custody. Both theories are inconsistent with: the histori-
cal record, the idea that suspension conditions restrict a sovereign's rules
for its own judges, and with Boumediene v. Bush itself.
A. Conceptualizing Habeas as Article III Judicial Power
Whatever the formal denomination of a habeas writ-as a right, a
privilege, or a remedy-prisoner access to that process is secured by the
combination of automatically-vested Article III judicial power and the
Suspension Clause. I do not argue that the Federal Constitution automat-
ically vests all Article III power in federal courts,"' that state courts
cannot adjudicate Article III subject matter,'12 that federal courts derive
any jurisdiction from common law,"' or that Congress must create and
vest any other Article III Judicial Power in an Article III court." 4  pre-
sent a theory of power that is specific to habeas authority, and it is not
applicable to other forms of federal jurisdiction.
"' Notwithstanding the Article III, Section 2 directive that the United States' judicial
power "shall be vested" in the Supreme and inferior federal courts, Congress has never vest-
ed all Article III power in federal courts; a rule that all judicial power automatically vests
would be wildly incompatible with substantial precedent. See Martin H. Redish & Curtis E.
Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical
Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 46-47 (1975).
112 State courts are often permitted, or even required, to adjudicate certain Article III sub-
ject matter. See infra note 228. Indeed, because the Madisonian Compromise meant that
Congress was not required to ordain and establish lower federal courts, there are certain
permissible configurations of judicial power in which state courts are the primary enforcers
of federal law. Moreover, even in the world where inferior federal courts do exist, they have
some power to award relief against federal officials. See, e.g., Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S.
141, 151-52 (1900) (assuming that state courts can eject federal officers); Buck v. Colbath,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 346-47 (1866) (sustaining jurisdiction in case alleging tortious con-
duct against federal officials).
113 I only mean to say that common law, of its own force, does not create federal jurisdic-
tion. The common law may, of course, supply various rules of decision in cases where the
Federal Constitution or a statute creates federal jurisdiction.
114 See Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 Duke L.J. 605, 607
(setting forth a similar set of caveats).
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I argue that habeas power vests in an Article III judge without enact-
ing legislation."'5 I do not, therefore, subscribe to the "Obligation Theo-
ry" that Chief Justice Marshall announced in Ex parte Bollman:
Acting under the immediate influence of [the Suspension Clause],
[the Framers] must have felt ... the obligation of providing efficient
means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life
and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself
would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted.' 16
The Chief Justice is making a case for why the Court should read Sec-
tion 14 of the 1787 Judiciary Act to include habeas jurisdiction, and he
did so by raising the specter of a "lifeless" writ in the absence of such a
statutory reading. The availability of process may be contingent on some
antecedent congressional action-ordaining and establishing courts and
populating them with Article III judicial officers"' 7-but the availability
of such process requires no further statutory authorization."' Professor
Francis Paschal has made a similar "automatically-vesting" argument,
although Professor Paschal (1) believed that habeas power was enjoyed
by all superior courts of record and for all custody (whether state or fed-
115 Several have argued in favor of a broader idea that judicial power vests automatically in
Article III courts. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 327-37 (1816); 2
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 395-97 (Thomas M.
Cooley ed., 4th ed., Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1873); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory
View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures from the Con-
stitutional Plan, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1515, 1521-23 (1986).
"
6 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807). The term obligation theory refers
more generally to the idea that Congress had to vest most or all of Article III jurisdiction in
federal courts. See Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitu-
tional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 862, 873
(1994).
117 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. Professor Paul Freund took the position that "[tihere must,
to be sure, be courts legislatively created before the writ of habeas corpus can be employed.
But having established Federal courts Congress would be powerless to deny the privilege of
the writ. Otherwise Article I, section 9 would be reduced to a dead letter." Brief for Re-
spondent at 29, United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (No. 23) [hereinafter Freund,
Hayman Brief].
' Cf. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304 n.24 (2001) (arguing that there would be constitu-
tional defects with a judiciary constituted without habeas access, notwithstanding Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's language in Bollman). The Supreme Court does not require an enabling stat-
ute to exercise its original jurisdiction. See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 300
(1888).
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eral), and (2) attributed that result primarily to the Suspension Clause. 9
I ultimately disagree with both of those propositions.
Boumediene has language supporting the idea that Article III automat-
ically vests habeas jurisdiction in federal judges appointed with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate. It expressly recognizes that the Federal
Constitution protects "liberty" by vesting a limited suspension power in
Article I, but also by vesting judicial power to grant habeas relief in the
first place: "The Clause protects the rights of the detained by affirming
the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account."l20
The Court does not say that the habeas power springs from the Suspen-
sion Clause-locating the source of a core judicial power in Article I
would be a little strange-but says that the Clause affirms the power of
the judiciary to use habeas proceedings to review sovereign custody.
Boumediene expressly applies the "Suspension Clause mandate" at
GTMO,12 1 but the Supreme Court's holding-that the federal detainees
had constitutionally-required access to the writ-makes sense only if the
Court also applied whatever constitutional provision created the habeas
authority to begin with. (Article I, Section 9 contains only suspension
conditions.) Boumediene's "Suspension Clause mandate" phrasing must
be inadvertent, unless the Court intended an unlikely holding that the
pertinent "duty and authority of the judiciary" arises only under Article I
of the Federal Constitution.122 What the Court accomplishes by applying
119 See Paschal, supra note 114, at 607.
120 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745 (emphasis added); see also id. at 787 ("[W]hen the judi-
cial power to issue habeas corpus properly is invoked the judicial officer must have adequate
authority to make a determination in light of the relevant law and facts and to formulate and
issue appropriate orders for relief, including, if necessary, an order directing the prisoner's
release." (emphasis added)).
121 Id. at 771; see also id. at 746 (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300-01); id. at 739 ("In decid-
ing the constitutional questions now presented we must determine whether petitioners are
barred from seeking the writ or invoking the protections of the Suspension Clause .... "
(emphasis added)).
12 Some scholars have apparently embraced the idea that the Suspension Clause is the
source of the habeas guarantee. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 541 ("[Boumediene] expound-
ed the Suspension Clause as guaranteeing the preservation of habeas corpus jurisdiction or
an equivalent means of judicial inquiry into the lawfulness of detention."). A more precise
opinion might say that the Suspension Clause provides the exclusive legislative authority for
restricting legislative power, but in that case the "protections" of the prisoners arise from
some other part of Article I, not § 9. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 562 (2004)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the Suspension Clause is to prohibit Congress from restricting habeas
power except by means ofsuspension. 123
Consistent with eighteenth- and nineteenth-century law, the habeas
power vests in judges, not just courts. English common-law judges
could, in their individual capacities, entertain the petition, award the writ
to adjudicate lawfulness, and order discharge.124 The 1789 Judiciary Act
authorized both judges and courts to issue the writ, and was arguably far
more concerned with the power of the judicial officer than the power of
the court itself.125 Habeas statutes in 1833 and 1842 granted to federal
judges a limited habeas power over state custody.12 6 The 1867 Habeas
Act, which statutorily provided for federal habeas review of state custo-
dy, specifies the power of both courts and judges. The modem habeas
statute permits both Supreme Court Justices and other federal judges to
grant the writ, 12 7 and authorizes the Justices to transfer declined habeas
applications to district courts. 12 8 None of this is to say that individual
judges could exercise the types of habeas power that judicial officers
have historically enjoyed without any review, but it is to say that the ha-
beas powers of courts and of judges were distinct.129 Earlier scholars
emphasizing the role of judges have argued that the "Suspension
Clause" is not violated if individual Supreme Court Justices retain au-
thority to grant the writ.13 0 My position differs in at least three respects.
First, the habeas powers described herein belong primarily to judicial of-
ficers, and only secondarily to courts. Second, these powers automatical-
ly vest in all Article III judges, not just Supreme Court Justices. Third,
123 The Court was more precise when it stated, "If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be
denied to [the GTMO detainees], Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of
the Suspension Clause." Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
124 See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
125 Describing exactly how much power the 1789 Act gave the Supreme Court remains a
matter of academic dispute. See infra Section II.C. To summarize, however, I find Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's argument in ExparteBollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807)-that § 14 of the
1789 Judiciary Act authorized the Supreme Court to grant habeas writs-unpersuasive. That
authority was plainly given to individual justices, however.
12 6 See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539; Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4
Stat. 634-35.
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2006).
128 See id. § 2241(b).
129 See Edward A. Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. Rev.
251, 271-76 (2005) (providing historical overview of habeas power exercised by individual
judges).
"0See id. at 289-90.
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under the Habeas Power Theory, a non-suspending restriction would vi-
olate Article III, not just the Suspension Clause.
B. Founding Support for the First Principle
For the Founding generation, habeas was not an obscure artifact of
English writ practice. The American colonists were intimately familiar
with the privilege and suspension. King George III suspended the writ,
pursuant to parliamentary authorization, six times during the Revolu-
tionary War."' American colonists followed habeas proceedings during
these suspension periods closely. 132 Newspapers extensively covered
cases where Americans were bailed after habeas proceedings.' 33 George
Washington stated as a public grievance that the British Suspension Acts
were means by which the King secured arbitrary imprisonment. 134 No
less public an authority than Edmund Burke published a pamphlet,
broadly circulated in America, that attacked the suspension statutes as an
affront to ancient English tradition.135
The Framers shared the public's nuanced understanding of the rela-
tionship between the privilege and suspension authority. In every colo-
ny, prisoners enjoyed a habeas privilege-usually the common-law vari-
ety-although at least one colony modeled a statutory privilege on the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.136 American colonists were extraordinarily
familiar with Blackstone's Commentaries, which contained what were
perceived as canonical statements about the writ, its relationship to
Magna Carta, and suspension.'3 7 Moreover, the Framers were familiar
'' See 22 Geo. 3, c. 1 (1782) (Eng.) (renewal); 21 Geo. 3, c. 2 (1781) (Eng.) (renewal); 20
Geo. 3, c. 5 (1780) (Eng.) (renewal); 19 Geo. 3, c. 1 (1779) (Eng.) (renewal); 18 Geo. 3, c. 1
(1778) (Eng.) (renewal); 17 Geo. 3, c. 9 (1777) (Eng.).
132 See Justin J. Wert, Habeas Corpus in America: The Politics of Individual Rights 33
(2011).
133 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 253.
134 See George Washington, Manifesto of General Washington, Commander in Chief of
the Forces of the United States of America, in Answer to General Burgoyne's Proclamation,
Continental J. & Wkly. Advertiser, Mar. 5, 1778, at 3, cited in Halliday & White, supra note
18, at 649.
135 See Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies in the House of Com-
mons (Mar. 22, 1775), in Edmund Burke: Selected Writings and Speeches 176-222 (Peter J.
Stanlis ed., 2009).
136 See generally Garrett & Kovarsky, supra note 41 (collecting supporting authority and
describing English privilege as "received" through colonial statutory or decisional law).
137 See 1 Blackstone, supra note 27, at *134-36; 4 Blackstone, supra note 27, at *129; 5
Blackstone, supra note 27, at *438.
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with the Massachusetts Suspension Clause, which served as a model for
Article I, Section 9 clause 2."3 Unlike the Federal Suspension Clause,
the Massachusetts language expressly required that the habeas privilege
be enjoyed "in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious and ample man-
ner."l 39 With the Massachusetts constitution in mind, South Carolinian
Constitutional Convention Delegate Charles Pinckney proposed a Sus-
pension Power using a clause worded to acknowledge a habeas privi-
lege. The proposal ultimately went to the Committee on Detail, where
several members supported language that would have categorically
barred suspension.
According to James Madison's chronicle, on August 20, 1787, Pinck-
ney's draft constitution provided that: "The privileges and benefit of the
Writ of Habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this Government in the most
expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the Legis-
lature except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a
limited time not exceeding - months."l4 0
On August 28: Pinckney urged the approval of similar language from
Madison's August 20 entry (omitting language of an affirmative guaran-
tee); John Rutledge sought to have habeas declared inviolable because
Congress would never have to suspend the privilege across the whole
country; Committee on Style and Arrangement Chair Gouverneur Mor-
ris moved that the language be, "The privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless where in cases of Rebellion or in-
vasion the public safety may require it"; and James Wilson questioned
whether there needed to be any authority to suspend, in light of the fact
that judges retained the ultimate discretion regarding conditions of re-
lease.141 When Pinckney initiated proceedings on August 28, he did not
include an enjoyment clause in the proposed Suspension Clause text,
apparently because he thought it was unnecessary. He introduced his
proposal by "urging the propriety of securing the benefit of the Habeas
Corpus in the most ample manner." 42 Significantly, on August 28, the
138 See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Al-
iens, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 961, 972 (1998).
139 Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. VI, art. VII.
140 See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 20, 1787), in 2 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 341 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
141 See id. at 438.
142 William F. Duker, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus 129 (1980); see also
Paschal, supra note 114, at 610 ("Clearly, as to Pin[c]kney, reliance on the negative phrase-
ology did not connote any retreat.").
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Committee was already very familiar with the Madisonian Compromise,
the principle that Congress would not have to create lower courts. 143 The
fact that they were familiar with the Madisonian Compromise when they
accepted the extant wording of the Suspension Clause ends up being a
significant piece of evidence in favor of the first principle of habeas
power.
All ten states voting on Morris's proposed text agreed to the portion
preceding the word "unless"-that "[t]he privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended."'" The remainder of Morris's proposed
language, "unless where in cases of Rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it," was approved 7-3, with Georgia, North Carolina,
and South Carolina voting no. 145 (Some time between that vote and the
final draft of the Clause, the word "where" was changed to "when.")1 4 6
There were a number of changes between Pinckney's version of the
Clause that appeared in Madison's August 20 notes and the version that
the Convention ultimately approved, but the elimination of the explicit
reference to enjoyment does not mean that the Framers did not intend to
guarantee the privilege. In fact, quite the opposite seems true. The three
states voting against the second part of Morris's formulation wanted
there to be no suspension power whatsoever. 147 In other words, some
states wanted that guarantee made express, but the Framers appeared to
agree unanimously that express language was not necessary to secure the
desired meaning.148
The "yes" votes also suggest that the Federal Constitution created a
habeas power. Wilson, in a speech to the Pennsylvania Convention, stat-
ed that he meant "to show the reason why the right of habeas corpus was
secured by a particular declaration in its favor."l 49 In Federalist 83,
Hamilton stated that the Habeas Corpus Act was "provided for . .. in the
143 The Madisonian Compromise was affirmed by the Convention on July 18 and reaf-
firmed by the Committee on Detail on August 6. See Edmund Randolph, Suggestion for
Conciliating the Small States (July 10, 1787), reprinted in 3 Farrand, supra note 140, at 55-
56; 2 Farrand, supra note 140, at 183, 186, 188 (Wilson-Rutledge draft of final Committee
Re ort).
See 2 Farrand, supra note 140, at 438.
145 See id.
146 See id. at 596.
147 See Paschal, supra note 114, at 611.
148 See id. at 608-09, 611.
149 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
108-09 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1861), cited in Paschal, supra note 114, at 611 n.23 [hereinafter
Elliot's Debates] (emphasis omitted).
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plan of the convention." 50 In Federalist 84, he wrote that "[t]he estab-
lishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex post facto
laws, and of titles of nobility, to which we have no corresponding provi-
sions in [the New York] constitution, are perhaps greater securities to
liberty and republicanism than any it contains."1' Federalist 84, in fact,
was almost entirely dedicated to the idea that the failure to enumerate
specific rights in the constitution should not be interpreted as a failure to
provide for or recognize them.15 2
To be clear, I doubt that the Framers, the ratifying conventions, and
the broader body politic shared a fixed understanding of the way the
Suspension Clause interacted with the rest of the Federal Constitution.
There is nevertheless considerable historical evidence that the Constitu-
tion created habeas power for federal judicial officers to scrutinize fed-
eral custody.
C. Competing Theories
Resistance to the idea that the Federal Constitution guarantees some
quantum of habeas process partially reflects a riddle involving Marbury
v. Madison.. and the Madisonian Compromise. 5 4 According to these
theories, a constitutionally-vested Article III habeas power would be dif-
ficult to reconcile with the following maxims of federal jurisdiction: (1)
that Congress cannot add to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court (Marbury) and (2) that inferior federal courts are optional (the
Madisonian Compromise).'s In a world where there are no lower courts
and where the Supreme Court could not exercise original jurisdiction in
habeas cases, the argument is that there can be no federal habeas power.
The implication is that there can be no constitutional prohibition on leg-
islation stripping the habeas jurisdiction of federal courts and judicial of-
ficers.
There are two major theories trafficking in this riddle. According to
the first, what I call the "Null Power Hypothesis," the Federal Constitu-
150 The Federalist No. 83, at 562-63 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961).
s The Federalist No. 84, at 577 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
152 See id.
153 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
154 See Hartnett, supra note 129, at 275-89; Stephen I. Vladeck, The Riddle of the One-
Way Ratchet: Habeas Corpus and the District of Columbia, 12 Green Bag 2d 71, 71-72
(2008).
1ss See Neuman, supra note 6, at 557.
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tion guarantees no habeas access whatsoever. According to the second,
what I call the "Inter-Sovereign Habeas Hypothesis," the Federal Consti-
tution provides for no federal habeas power and the Suspension Clause
prohibits interference only with state habeas power. Both of these theo-
ries are implausible, albeit for slightly different reasons.
1. The Null Power Hypothesis
The Null Power Hypothesis goes something like this: If Article I does
not require Congress to establish inferior federal courts (what the Madi-
sonian Compromise says), and if the Supreme Court cannot issue habeas
writs pursuant to its original jurisdiction (what Marbury and Ex parte
Bollman say),'16 then the Constitution cannot guarantee any habeas ac-
cess at all. In a world with no inferior Article III courts, there would be
no court with jurisdiction to issue the writ. The most prominent deci-
sional endorsement of the Null Power Hypothesis comes from Justice
Antonin Scalia, in his INS v. St. Cyr dissent.' Justice Scalia, in turn, re-
lied on an influential mid-century article by Professor Rex Collings,
which selectively cited some of the aforementioned evidence regarding
the Clause's drafting history.'5 8  Justice Scalia remarked: "In-
deed . .. four of the state ratifying conventions [objected] that the Con-
stitution failed affirmatively to guarantee a right to habeas corpus.""
Justice Scalia is correct in the sense that ratifying conventions had those
reservations, but he draws exactly the wrong conclusion. He seems to
imply that the Suspension Clause was ratified because the states-in-favor
wanted there to be no provision for enjoyment of the privilege. As Sec-
tion II.B demonstrates, however, the reason that the Clause was passed
over the objections was because the existence of the habeas privilege
was presumed. 60 An affirmative reference to the privilege was almost
certainly omitted so that the habeas remedy would not, by negative im-
156 See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137.
Bollman held that the Supreme Court could issue poorly denominated "original" habeas
writs only pursuant to its appellate jurisdiction specified in Article III, § 2. See 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) at 101.
157 See 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A straightforward reading of this
text discloses that it does not guarantee any content to (or even the existence of) the writ of
habeas corpus. . . .").
' See Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts--Constitutional Right or Legisla-
tive Grace?, 40 Calif. L. Rev. 335, 341-42 (1952).
1'9 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160 See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
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plication, disparage any rights and immunities that the Constitution did
mention.'6 1
The Null Power Hypothesis also treats Marbury and Ex parte Boll-
man, canonical decisions by the Marshall Court, as dispositive evidence
of what Article III, Section 2 meant when it was drafted and ratified. 162
Whatever the influence those opinions continue to exert on habeas law,
they are poor evidence of original meaning.
Article III, Section 2 subdivides the "judicial Power" into nine cate-
gories of cases ("heads"), designating six heads as the subject of the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction and three heads as the subject of its
original jurisdiction.163 In Marbury, the Court held that Congress could
not accrete or diminish the Court's original jurisdiction.' 6 Several years
later, Ex parte Bollman decided the question of whether the Supreme
Court could exercise jurisdiction over "original habeas petitions"-
habeas petitions filed with the Court in the first instance. 16 5 Most as-
sumed that Bollman would be the death knell for original habeas juris-
diction, but the Marshall Court held that, as long as original habeas au-
thority was used to review some inferior judicial determination, it was a
constitutionally permissible exercise of appellate power under Article
III, Section 2.6 Bollman was actually two holdings: (1) that any original
habeas authority exercised had to be pursuant to a grant of appellate
power; and (2) that the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted such jurisdiction.
In making the first holding, the Court remarked that "for the meaning of
the term habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the com-
mon law; but the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the
United States, must be given by written law." 67
That language has generated two centuries of confusion about wheth-
er the Federal Constitution guarantees habeas process or not. Marbury
and Bollman should not straightjacket judicial power to conduct habeas
process, for two reasons. First, I doubt that Marbury correctly captured
how Section 2 permits Congress to distribute Article III judicial power.
Article III was instead supposed to set a floor for original jurisdiction
161 See supra Section IIB.
162 See supra note 156.
163 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
6 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174-78.
65 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 94-96.
166 See id. at 100-01.
161 Id. at 93-94.
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and a ceiling for appellate jurisdiction, and Congress can move up from
the floor or down from the ceiling using statutes. 16 8 Second, even Mar-
bury's strained Article III, Section 2 holding can be reconciled with a
habeas power that vests in federal judges.169
Marbury and Bollman as Evidence of Original Meaning. Marbury
and Bollman do not read as strong evidence of original meaning. Chief
Justice Marshall's opinions generally, as well as Marbury and Bollman
specifically, are famous for having accomplished very important politi-
cal and institutional objectives.17 0 These objectives, however, meant the
opinions were inconsistent with fairly unobjectionable understandings of
the Constitution or the Judiciary Act of 1789.171 Section 13 authorized
the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus, and Marbury held that
such authority conflicted with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
by impermissibly vesting the Court with original jurisdiction that the
Constitution did not specify. 17 2 The tension between the Judiciary Act of
1789 and Article III, Section 2 existed, Marbury reasons, because the
requirement that the "supreme court shall have original jurisdiction" in
several categories of cases logically required that the Court shall not
have it in other cases.' I concur with a number of people who believe
that the conflict between the Statute and the Constitution was manufac-
tured to create the need for Marbury's famous holding involving judicial
review. 174
168 See infra notes 170-77.
169 Although I do not treat the possibility extensively here, Marbury's integrity would be
preserved if other constitutional provisions required the existence of lower federal courts,
except during a habeas suspension.
170 See 2 William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
United States 1040 (1953); Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution
75 (1988); Clinton, supra note 115, at 1561-62; see also James E. Pfander, Marbury, Origi-
nal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1515,
1516 & n.2 (2001) (collecting citations in support of the proposition that "an air of political
expediency lingers over [Marbury]").
n See sources collected supra note 170.
172 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175-78.
17 See id. at 174 (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2).
174 See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred
Years, 1789-1888, at 67-68 (1985); James E. Pfander, Principles of Federal Jurisdiction 19
(2d ed. 2011) ("Many scholars have argued that Marshall created the conflict that led to his
discussion ofjudicial review, a conflict he might have sidestepped."). Specifically, there was
no reason to read § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as a freestanding grant of jurisdiction,
and the Court could have read it as granting only authority that was auxiliary to appellate or
original jurisdiction that it already had. See Currie, supra, at 67-68.
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Instead, Marbury's Article III, Section 2 rationale rests entirely on the
proposition that, if Congress could augment original jurisdiction to in-
clude additional categories of judicial power, then the clause specifying
that jurisdiction would be surplusage.175 Such a proposition is obviously
wrong. The Article III, Section 2 language subdividing jurisdiction into
original and appellate categories would still have meaning if Marshall
had interpreted it as a rule that Congress cannot diminish the former.
Others have powerfully made the point that the Framers intended Article
III, Section 2 to have precisely this meaning,176 and I do not reprise those
arguments here. I do, however, want to emphasize that Marbury con-
tains no extrinsic evidence about what the Framers intended or what the
public understood Article III, Section 2 to mean. And Bollman simply
followed from Marbury. Many scholars believe that Chief Justice Mar-
shall overlooked original habeas jurisdiction when he wrote Marbury,
and that resting Bollman on a theory of appellate authority was the fic-
tion necessary to avoid lopping off a power that the Framers plainly in-
tended courts to have.'77 I am not suggesting that the Court overturn or
otherwise revise Marbury and Bollman. I am, however, suggesting that
those decisions are not probative of original meaning on other constitu-
tional questions.
Habeas as a Power of Article III Judges. In reality, rejecting'a Null
Power Hypothesis might not require theorists to go near Marbury and
Bollman. If habeas jurisdiction is an Article III power that vests in judg-
' See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174.
76 See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J.
1, 31-33 (arguing that Article III, § 2 simply provided a constitutional floor for original ju-
risdiction and that Congress could add types of constitutionally specified judicial power to
the Court's original docket); see also Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review:
Its Legal and Historical Bias and Other Essays 5-6 (1914) (same); Crosskey, supra note 170,
at 1041-42 (same); 2 George L. Haskins & Herbert A. Johnson, History of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815, at 200-01
(Paul A. Freund ed., 1981) (same); Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Un-
derstandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 329,
398-400 (same); Clinton, supra note 115, at 1516-19, 1523 (same). Some subsequent schol-
ars have advanced alternative rationales for the holding, but none of the historical evidence
in those accounts surfaces in Marbury itself. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section
13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 469-77
(1989) (justifying Marbury's Article III holding as a rule about geographically inconvenient
docketing in the Supreme Court).
17 See Larry W. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies 78-79 (1981); Steiker, supra note 116,
at 876-77.
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es-which is entirely consistent with historical practice 1-then the ten-
sion with those cases vanishes.
If a Supreme Court Justice (a judge) can afford habeas process in an
individual capacity, then one can recognize a constitutionally-vested ha-
beas power without compromising the integrity of the Madisonian Com-
promise and the rule against accreting the Supreme Court's original ju-
risdiction. Even if there are no inferior federal courts and even if Con-
Congress reduces the number of Justices on the Court to one, there
would be an Article III judicial officer with jurisdiction to grant habeas
relief. If the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the individual Justice's
ruling in such a case could be denominated as appellate under Article
III, Section 2, then there would be no conflict with Marbury.'
2. The Inter-Sovereign Habeas Hypothesis.
Several prominent scholars have attempted to reconcile Marbury and
Bollman with a constitutional guarantee of habeas access by interpreting
the Suspension Clause as a prohibition against federal interference with
state habeas privileges. The most influential exponent of that position is
Professor William Duker.180 The Inter-Sovereign Habeas Hypothesis
centers on two cases bookending the Civil War, each holding that state
habeas relief could not issue for federal custody: Ableman v. Booth'
and Tarble's Case.182 Under the Inter-Sovereign Habeas Hypothesis,
178 See supra notes 31-42.
'
79 Cf. Dallin H. Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962
Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 165-66 & n.56 (observing that Supreme Court review of an individual
Justice's decision was commonplace during the early years of the American republic). In
later dicta, the Supreme Court refused to denominate its power over judges of inferior courts
as appellate jurisdiction over the inferior court itself. See In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
176, 191-92 (1847). Metzger, however, does not reach the issue of whether the Supreme
Court's authority to review the decision of a circuit-riding Justice could be considered appel-
late.
180 See Duker, supra note 142, at 126-80 (setting forth an argument that the Constitution
protects state habeas for federal prisoners). Professor David Shapiro, coauthor of the leading
federal courts casebook, also endorses this view of the relationship between the Suspension
Clause and the Madisonian Compromise. See Shapiro, supra note 51, at 64 n.17 (citing
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System
403-05 (6th ed. 2009)); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale
L.J. 1425, 1510 (1987) (contending that Booth and Tarble's Case should be read as "attrib-
uting to Congress a desire for exclusive federal court jurisdiction in habeas proceedings
against federal officers").
18 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1859).
182 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411-12 (1872).
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Booth and Tarble's Case were wrongly decided because: (1) historically
speaking, state judges did issue habeas writs to federal jailors; and (2) a
constitutional guarantee of habeas access could refer to such a prac-
tice.'83 I agree with (1) but not with (2); even though the cases ignore in-
consistent historical evidence, the Federal Constitution does not protect
any state habeas power over federal custody.
a. Booth and Tarble-Supremacy or Preemption?
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 provided for extraterritorial capture
and rendition of slaves seized in northern states.184 Some northern states
responded with "personal liberty laws" that criminalized activity neces-
sary to capture and rendition, such as slave kidnapping. In Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,'86 the Supreme Court invalidated a representative person-
al liberty statute,187 but many northern states passed new legislation pro-
hibiting the use of state law enforcement resources to implement federal
law.' 88 The Compromise of 1850 actually consisted of four statutes, one
of which was effectively an 1850 Fugitive Slave Act that rendered the
post-Prigg personal liberty laws inoperative.189 The 1850 Fugitive Slave
Act enraged abolitionists and provoked new legal theories of interposi-
tion.190
Northern state judges used habeas to free federal prisoners convicted
under the fugitive slave provisions, and the conflict between state and
federal sovereigns came to a head in Ableman v. Booth."' In 1854, Unit-
ed States Marshal Stephen Ableman arrested abolitionist Sherman Booth
for aiding a fugitive slave's escape to Canada.' 92 Aggressively challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the Compromise, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court issued a habeas writ to free Booth,' 93 even after he had been con-
183 See Duker, supra note 142, at 181.
184 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 302, 305.
185 See generally Thomas D. Morris, Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the
North, 1780-1861 (1974) (collecting laws).
186 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
187 See Wert, supra note 132, at 55.
188 See Morris, supra note 185, at 107-27; Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme
Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story's Judicial Nationalism, 1994 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 247, 284, 288.
89 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, 464.
190 See Wert, supra note 132, at 61-62.
19' 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 507-08.
192 See id. at 507.
193 See id. at 508-09.
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victed in a federal district court. 194 The U.S. Supreme Court finally re-
solved Booth against Wisconsin four years later, in an intensely nation-
alistic opinion by Chief Justice Taney. The Court held that the Suprema-
cy Clause prohibited a state court from ordering the release of a prisoner
confined pursuant to a federal criminal judgment.'"
Until the Supreme Court decided Tarble's Case in 1871, many read
Booth as barring only state habeas relief for criminally-convicted federal
prisoners. 19 6 Tarble once again thrust habeas into the debate over nation-
al supremacy, and again involved a defiant Wisconsin court.'9 Tarble
was a minor when he enlisted in the Union Army, but signed a document
swearing that he was twenty-one.'98 He later deserted and was brought
up for a military trial.' 99 Tarble's father sought a habeas writ to chal-
lenge military custody on the ground that the father's consent was a
condition for legally-operative enlistment.2 00 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court might have justified an order releasing Tarble by invoking the dis-
tinction between military and post-conviction custody, but it was loaded
for bear. It held that state courts could not use habeas to scrutinize any
federal custody whatsoever.20 1
Tarble treated Booth as a rule that federal power over all federal de-
tention was exclusive.2 02 With the wounds from the Civil War still fresh,
the opinion recognized dual sovereignty, but also emphasized the need
for "temporary supremacy" when a state and the federal government
disagreed as to the lawfulness of a detention.203 On a practical note, the
Supreme Court argued (persuasively, I think) that state habeas authority
over federal detention would have compromised the efficacy of military
204operations.
To the extent Tarble indicates that state habeas relief did not issue for
federal prisoners, it is obviously wrong. Beginning in 1789, state courts
194 See id. at 509-10.
195 See id. at 526.
196 See Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler, supra note 10, at 402.
'9 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 397-98.
'9 See id. at 398-99.
199 Id. at 399.
200 Id. at 398.
201 Id. at 411.
202 Id. at 403-04.
203 Id. at 407.
204 See id. at 408-09.
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frequently used the habeas writ to free people in federal custody. 20 5
These cases usually involved military detention.206 During the Civil War,
state judges from New York, Ohio, Iowa, and Maine granted habeas
writs to federal military enlistees.207 Of course, just because state habeas
writs had historically issued in such circumstances does not mean that
Tarble was wrongly decided. The Supreme Court invalidates longstand-
ing judicial practices all the time.2 08 The more important point is that
Tarble involves a question about whether the Constitution permitted
state courts to issue habeas writs to federal prisoners-not whether the
Constitution required that they be able to do so.
b. Rejecting the Inter-Sovereign Habeas Hypothesis
Professor Duker argues that "the framers intended the clause only to
restrict Congressional power to suspend state habeas for federal prison-
ers." 209 The appeal of the Inter-Sovereign Habeas Hypothesis, which
treats Booth and Tarble as wrongly decided, is that it reconciles a habeas
guarantee with Marbury and the Madisonian Compromise.2 '0 Even
though it avoids some of the problematic logical commitments of the
Null Power Hypothesis, the Inter-Sovereign Theory still suffers from
many of the same flaws. For the Inter-Sovereign Habeas Hypothesis to
work, the Federal Constitution would require that state judges have a
habeas power over federal custodians. The only circumstances under
which the federal government could interfere with this power would be
when the suspension conditions (rebellion, invasion, and public safety)
are satisfied.
First, the Inter-Sovereign Habeas Hypothesis is inconsistent with the
constitutional concept of a "suspension." A suspension statute authorizes
205 See Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 353
(1930).
206 See Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 243,
288 (1965); Todd E. Pettys, State Habeas Relief for Federal Extrajudicial Detainees, 92
Minn. L. Rev. 265, 268-69, 272 (2007).
207 See Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler, supra note 10, at 402-03 (citing Warren, supra
note 205, at 357).
208 For example, the Supreme Court did so in Bollman. See supra notes 164-67 and ac-
companying text.
2 0 Duker, supra note 142, at 126.
210 From time to time, authors will refurbish the State Habeas Hypothesis, relying on Pro-
fessor Duker's scholarship. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 206, at 309-18 (putting a modem
gloss on the State Habeas Hypothesis).
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detention and strips some judicial power to grant bail or release.2 1 1 If the
Inter-Sovereign Habeas Hypothesis is true, then prohibition in the Sus-
pension Clause does not make sense. The Clause would have to mean
that Article I, Section 9 barred Congress from stripping state judges of
their authority to discharge federal prisoners. That reading of the clause
is improbable; Article I, Section 9 bars Congress from certain actions
that it would otherwise have power to take under Article I, Section 8.
Article I, Section 8 does not appear to give Congress any authority to
strip state habeas judges of their authority to order discharge.212 Con-
gress would never have needed to pass a state-oriented suspension stat-
ute because any state judicial power to order discharge would be dis-
placed by the preemptive effect of the federal statute that authorized
detention to begin with. The Inter-Sovereign Habeas Hypothesis reads
the Suspension Clause as a prohibition on a power that Congress does
not otherwise have (and would not need to exercise if it did); it would
thereby render the Article I suspension conditions superfluous.
Second, if the Suspension Clause was intended to recognize a state
habeas power over federal custody, then one might expect to find some
recognition of the habeas privilege in Article I, Section 10, which limits
the powers of the Several States.213 A clever advocate might argue that
the Framers did not mention habeas in Article I, Section 10 because they
intended there to be limits on federal suspension of a state privilege (ex-
pressed in Section 9) but not on state suspension. This distribution of
habeas and suspension power, however, is particularly difficult to square
with the previously-discussed evidence about how the Framers concep-
211 See supra Section I.C.
212 If Article I, § 8 does create a power to "suspend" the habeas privilege for federal pris-
oners in state court, that power would probably have to come from an authority to enact laws
necessary and proper to provide for the common defense, to control naturalization, and to
govern the land and naval forces. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, 12-16, 18. Professor
Duker would argue that some preclusion of state habeas power might have been necessary
and proper to the Article I, § 8 power to "suppress insurrection and repel invasion." See
Duker, supra note 142, at 131. Professor Duker, however, selectively edits the predicate
enumerated power. The relevant clause enumerates a federal power to "provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Inva-
sions." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (emphasis added). The more plausible understanding of
a suspension power is as auxiliary to the Article I, § 8 power to constitute the federal judici-
213 The Framers could have put habeas language in both places. For example, §§ 9 and 10
both forbid sovereigns from passing bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, as well as from
granting titles of nobility. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9-10. Only § 9, however, contains a suspen-
sion provision.
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tualized the privilege. Why would the Framers have permitted state gov-
ernments to freely suspend review over federal custody-for whatever
reason-when the federal government could not? State habeas power is
in some tension with the location of the reference to the habeas privilege
in Article 1.214
Third, and most importantly, in much the same way that proponents
of the Null Power Hypothesis draw precisely the wrong conclusions
from the historical evidence, so does Professor Duker. For example, he
discusses an instance where Alexander Hamilton, writing as "Publius" in
the Federalist Papers, referred to the "establishment of the writ of habeas
corpus."2 15 Professor Duker explains that Hamilton's comment does not
reflect a belief that the Federal Constitution contained a federal habeas
power, arguing that it instead referenced a habeas power arising under
the New York State Constitution. Whether Professor Duker is right or
wrong about that particular snippet, the rest of the historical record, in-
cluding many other parts of Federalist 83 and 84, shows that Hamilton
believed the Federal Constitution created a federal habeas power to se-
cure the privilege.216
Other Founding-era evidence that Professor Duker's monograph cites
is not strong. For example, in Massachusetts, Judge Increase Sumner
explained to the State Convention that the Suspension Clause was only a
restriction on Congress, and that a state prisoner would be entitled to the
writ.2 17 That explanation is perfectly consistent with a federal habeas
power-and with the idea that states could also empower judges to grant
relief for state custody. Similarly, Professor Duker observes that, in
Pennsylvania, the ratifying convention was told that "the right of habeas
214 Professor Duker suggests gingerly that the Article I, § 9 placement of the Clause sup-
ports the Inter-Sovereign Habeas Hypothesis. See Duker, supra note 142, at 131-32. His log-
ic is that several clauses in Article I, § 9 restrict the power of the federal government vis-d-
vis the Several States. See id. But certainly not all Article 1, § 9 clauses are legislative re-
strictions of this sort. Why, if the Suspension Clause were intended to preserve state habeas
power, would the relevant clause not say so expressly? Compare, for example, U.S. Const.
art. 1, § 9, cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State."), with
id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 ("No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Reve-
nue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one
State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.").
215 See Duker, supra note 142, at 132-33.
216 See supra Section II.B.
217 See 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 149, at 108-09, cited in Duker, supra note 142, at
134.
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corpus was secured by a particular declaration in its favor." 2 18 That
statement appears incorrect (unless the Suspension Clause is the express
statement), but it does not suggest that the power secured was that of
state judges. As Professor Duker grudgingly admits, the statement is
probably one made with "studied ambiguity." 2 19
Various other states-including Virginia, Rhode Island, North Caro-
lina, and New York-all expressed doubts about a theory of "implied"
power upon which, in their view, enjoyment of the privilege under the
Federal Constitution depended. 2 20 The extended colloquies in these de-
bates do mention that state constitutions secured the privilege, but not in
ways that suggest the speakers thought a state privilege was ever ame-
nable to federal suspension. The speakers were generally asking either
(1) why the Federal Constitution was being read to contain an implied
suspension power or (2) why it did not contain an express power to issue
the writ.22 1 Moreover, Duker omits the most important piece of infor-
mation about the conventions that voiced these questions-that they
were ultimately convinced by the argument that the Federal Constitution
did sufficiently imply a federal habeas power.222 Proponents of the im-
plied exclusivity variation might respond that the variation is indeed in-
consistent with the language of Tarble, but that the variation is the way
out of the riddle that does the least violence to other established princi-
ples of constitutional structure. I hope that my principles of habeas pow-
er show that a more elegant solution is possible.
3. Rejecting the Implied Exclusivity Variation
Other scholars who are unwilling to reject pertinent language in Tar-
ble or Marbury have set forth more nuanced theories of habeas power.223
218 Id. at 455, cited in Duker, supra note 142, at 133.
219 See Duker, supra note 142, at 133.
220 1 Elliot's Debates, supra note 149, at 243, 328, 344, cited in Duker, supra note 142, at
161 nn.60-61, 162 nn.62-67; id., vol. 2, at 399, 403, 407, cited in Duker, supra note 142, at
161 nn.60-61, 162 nn.62-67; id., vol. 3, at 449, 461, 464, 658, cited in Duker, supra note
142, at 161 nn.60-61, 162 nn.62-67.
221 See Duker, supra note 142, at 135.
222 See supra Section II.B.
223 1 commit most of this subsection to the most prominent of such positions, but I want to
briefly touch on theories advanced by Professors Edward Hartnett and Stephen Vladeck. The
gist of Professor Hartnett's theory is that an enjoyment principle can be reconciled with
Marbury, Tarble's Case, and the Madisonian Compromise because Supreme Court Justices
could issue writs in their individual capacities. See Hartnett, supra note 129, at 271-89. Su-
preme Court Justices are vested with habeas power, but I also argue (under a very different
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The most prominent theory salvages Tarble as an "implied exclusivity"
case. 224 Stated pithily, the implied exclusivity theory posits that the Fed-
eral Constitution does guarantee some federal habeas power; it reads
Tarble as a sub-constitutional holding that state habeas power was simp-
ly preempted by the extant federal habeas statute. The extraordinary ac-
ademic pedigree of the theory notwithstanding, 225 the implied exclusivity
rationale cannot be reconciled with the habeas language in Tarble.2 26
(The implied exclusivity argument, however, remains a viable means of
evaluating other grants of federal judicial power to federal courts.)
constitutional theory) that all Article III judges are so vested. Professor Vladeck argues that
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia may exercise common-law habeas jurisdiction
over federal detention. See Vladeck, supra note 154, at 71-72. Professor Vladeck's argument
is a variant of the implied preemption theory that I discuss in the above-line text, and it is
susceptible to many of the same objections that I specify there. Moreover, a constitutional
theory of habeas power predicated on such a prominent role for the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia should probably yield to other theories that would retain the centrality
of the inferior federal courts, the Supreme Court, or its Justices.224 See Neuman, supra note 75, at 596.
225 See, e.g., Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler, supra note 10, at 405 (suggesting that Tarble
might "be justified on the ground that federal statutes (and not the Constitution of its own
force) impliedly establish habeas corpus for persons in federal custody as a domain of exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction"); Amar, supra note 180, at 1510 ("[Booth and Tarble] can be justi-
fied only if they are understood simply as attributing to Congress a desire for exclusive fed-
eral court jurisdiction in habeas proceedings against federal officers."); Michael G. Collins,
Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev.
39, 102-03 (1995) ("[Ilt is possible to read Tarble . . . as merely expressing an implicit con-
gressional preference for federal statutory exclusivity in federal officer habeas cases . . . .");
Redish & Woods, supra note 111, at 101 (articulating an implied exclusivity rule that "can
be overcome only by a carefully considered, conscious decision by Congress"); Amanda L.
Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 333, 400 (2006) ("[Tarble's most
defensible reading] is that the Court interpreted Congress's provision for federal court habe-
as jurisdiction with respect to federal petitioners as impliedly exclusive of state courts.");
Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State
Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 Yale L.J. 2195, 2227 (2003) (arguing that
Tarble is predicated on the idea that the habeas statutes "reflected an implicit congressional
determination that state jurisdiction was not appropriate").
226I want to distance myself from those who argue that Tarble is incorrect simply because
of the more generalized idea that Article III contemplates concurrent state jurisdiction over
federal questions. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 206, at 298-99 (treating habeas as subject to
the same preemption rules as other Article III subject matter); see also id. at 295 n.174 (col-
lecting sources identifying the constitutional reading of Tarble as inconsistent with the prin-
ciple of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over Article III subject matter). That propo-
sition is certainly true, but it ignores the unique constitutional configuration of habeas power
and the unique implications that state habeas scrutiny of federal custody has for federal su-
premacy.
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In the period between Booth and Tarble, many assumed Booth barred
only state habeas review of federal convictions.227 As a result, Judge
Field wrote Tarble in particularly categorical terms, and-
notwithstanding the opinion's tortured take on concurrent state and fed-
eral jurisdiction over Article III subject matter 228-the opinion (like
Booth) is littered with language that appears inconsistent with any im-
plied exclusivity rationale. 229 For example, the Court observed that there
was a legislative remedy for excessive federal habeas process, indicating
by negative implication that no such federal legislative remedy could
solve excessive state habeas process.2 30 Moreover, the Court believed
that recognition of a state habeas power to scrutinize military custody
would necessarily imply a state habeas power to scrutinize any federal
custody.231' No such slippery slope would merit consideration if Con-
gress could simply preempt state habeas process for enclaves of federal
custody. Tarble and Booth are categorical holdings against state habeas
power.232
227 See Duker, supra note 142, at 153.
228 1 join the overwhelming consensus in affirming, contrary to some readings of Tarble,
that states have a pivotal role in administrating federal law generally. Tarble repeatedly im-
plies that Article III subject matter is not justiciable in state court. See, e.g., Tarble, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) at 407 ("[N]either [state nor federal government] can intrude with its judicial pro-
cess into the domain of the other, except so far as such intrusion may be necessary on the
part of the National government to preserve its rightful supremacy in cases of conflict of au-
thority."). The idea that state courts would be integrally involved in the adjudication of some
Article III subject matter is almost universally accepted. See The Federalist No. 82, at 555
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Con-
gress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev.
1362, 1401 (1953).
229 See, e.g., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 405 ("[Habeas jurisdiction must derive] either from the
United States or the State. It certainly has not been conferred on them by the United States;
and it is equally clear it was not in the power of the State to confer it, even if it had attempted
to do so; for no State can authorize one of its judges or courts to exercise judicial power, by
habeas corpus or otherwise, within the jurisdiction of another and independent government."
(quoting Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 515-16)).
230 See id. at 409.
231 See id. at 402. A similar slippery-slope argument appears in Booth. See 62 U.S. (21
How.) at 514-15.
232 Tarble does observe that the prisoner would have a federal forum for his claim. See 80
U.S. at (13 Wall.) 410. That language could support the argument that the ruling was contin-
gent upon the availability of a federal forum.
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III. PRINCIPLE 2: LAWFULNESS AS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVE
The raison d 'tre of habeas power is, in effect, the opposite of a polit-
ical question; it is the authority of judges to consider what it means for
detention to be lawful. It is federal judicial power to determine whether
a federal prisoner's custody is unconstitutional, not authorized by law, or
procedurally defective-as well as power to decide what each of those
terms means. Congress may not break this prerogative under legislative
saddle; it may not require courts to treat any prior process as dispositive
proof of lawfulness. Federal courts-and ultimately the Supreme
Court-must determine the presumptive weight prior custody determi-
nations should carry.
A. Boumediene as a Habeas Power Case
In Boumediene v. Bush, no Justice argued that the Federal Constitu-
tion left habeas access entirely unguaranteed.233 Moreover, Boumediene
partially embraces the second principle of habeas power, that federal
judges always decide how much prior process proves federal custody to
be lawful. Boumediene specified the constitutional test for a non-
suspension restriction: whether the alternative means to test custody is
an "adequate substitute" for the writ.2 34
Whether a statutory scheme is a suitable habeas substitute obviously
necessitates an underlying sense of what habeas process requires.
Boumediene's discussion of adequacy is really just a proxy for the
Court's belief about what habeas must, at its core, do. Boumediene spec-
ifies two core features of habeas power: the power to consider whether
custody is lawful, and the power to order discharge. 2 35 Boumediene also
emphasizes that the protected scope of habeas review-specifically,
whether the Federal Constitution guarantees other features of habeas
233 See Neuman, supra note 6, at 538-39 ("Prior holdings had told us what the Suspension
Clause does not protect, or what the Suspension Clause might possibly protect. Boumediene
clarifies, in the concrete way that only a holding can in a system that privileges precedent,
what the Suspension Clause does protect.").
234 See 553 U.S. at 771 ("In light of this holding the question becomes whether the statute
stripping jurisdiction to issue the writ avoids the Suspension Clause mandate because Con-
gress has provided adequate substitute procedures for habeas corpus.").
235 See id. at 779 ("[T]he privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful
opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to the erroneous application or in-
terpretation of relevant law. And the habeas court must have the power to order the condi-
tional release of an individual unlawfully detained. . . ." (citation omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
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consideration-turns on the degree of legal process (judicial and non-
judicial) informing the underlying custody determination.23 6 For exam-
ple, in an extended passage, Boumediene contrasted its scrutiny of the
Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") detention with deference
owed to a criminal judgment issued after a full-blown trial.237 Whatever
the form of custody, Boumediene held, there is a judicial power to issue
habeas writs; it entails that a judicial officer have authority to "make a
determination in light of the relevant law and facts and to formulate and
issue appropriate orders for relief, including, if necessary, an order di-
recting the prisoner's release."23 8
One could read the passage contrasting CSRT determinations and
criminal convictions as a substantive point that the Federal Constitution,
of its own force, requires that federal courts owe heightened deference to
criminal judgments.239 One can also read the passage as a rule, which the
Supreme Court decides prudentially, that the same deference applies. I
doubt very seriously that the Court considered this question, but the pru-
dential reading is more consistent with the traditional role of the judge in
habeas adjudication. Boumediene can and should be read as a rule with a
large institutional caveat. A criminal judgment can trigger a presumption
that custody is lawful; the deference to the custodial determination may
be greater than that afforded to prejudgment, executive, or military de-
tention-but courts get to decide the scope of the presumption. 24 0 As it
turns out, that reading of Boumediene helps make sense of the erratic
precedent that the decision had to synthesize.
B. Watkins and the Fallacy ofRestricted Habeas Power
One objective I have here is to unify the disparate habeas treatment of
executive and judicially-ordered detention. As the Boumediene passages
appearing in Section III.A suggest, there is an oversubscribed theory that
the permissibility of statutory habeas restrictions varies with respect to
236 See id. at 781-83 (articulating a sliding-scale test for proof of lawfulness). The specific
examples the Court uses to illustrate the variables dictating the degree of collateral scrutiny
are a right to introduce exculpatory evidence and a right to correct errors in the proceeding
that resulted in a custody order. See id. at 786.
237 See id. at 781 -83.
238 Id. at 787.
239 See id. at 782.
24o In discussing post-conviction review, however, the Court mentioned that the judicially
created abuse-of-the-writ distinction remained valid even after it was codified by statute. See
id. at 774.
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the type of underlying federal custody. That theory travels closely with
an argument that the Constitution allows Congress to entirely foreclose
collateral scrutiny of a federal criminal conviction-a position that has
never quite been accepted wisdom, but has enjoyed something approach-
ing that status.241 The argument's central case is Ex parte Watkins,242 an
other canonical opinion by Chief Justice Marshall. Like other opinions
by Chief Justice Marshall, however, Watkins was more about institu-
tional realities than it was about fidelity to the historic office of the writ
it considered. 243
241 See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 385 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("The
writ in 1789 was not considered a means by which one court of general jurisdiction exercises
post-conviction review over the judgment of another court of like authority." (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830) ("The judgment
of a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on all the world as the judg-
ment of this court would be. It is as conclusive on this court as it is on other courts. It puts an
end to inquiry concerning the fact, by deciding it."); Forsythe, supra note 48, at 1098 ("Thus,
the rule under the common law provided that persons convicted were excluded from the
privileges of the writ. This rule was part of the Act of 1679 and was incorporated into early
American state statutes."); David Horan, The Innocence Commission: An Independent Re-
view Board for Wrongful Convictions, 20 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 91, 104-05 (2000) ("In fact, the
writ of habeas corpus is not used in Britain to secure the release of a defendant whose deten-
tion is erroneous (as opposed to unlawful) where the person taking it, although it's within his
power to do, has made a procedural error, has misunderstood the relevant law, has failed to
take account of relevant matters, has taken into account irrelevant matters, [or] has acted
perversely." (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Matthew J. Mueller,
Handling Claims of Actual Innocence: Rejecting Federal Habeas Corpus as the Best Avenue
for Addressing Claims of Innocence Based on DNA Evidence, 56 Cath. U. L. Rev. 227, 227
n.3 (2006) ("The writ of habeas corpus that allows state prisoners to attack their conviction
in federal court is legislatively and judicially derived and differs immensely from the 'Great
Writ' (a pretrial remedy for testing the propriety of one's incarceration by the govern-
ment)."); Oaks, supra note 206, at 244-45 ("At common law and under the famous Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679 the use of the Great Writ against official restraints was simply to ensure
that a person was not held without formal charges and that once charged he was either bailed
or brought to trial within a specified time. If a prisoner was held by a valid warrant or pursu-
ant to the execution or judgment of a proper court, he could not obtain release by habeas
corpus."); Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 888, 931 (1998) ("[T]he reference to habeas corpus in the Constitution is to
the writ as it was known at common law. . . . [The writ] was not available to collaterally at-
tack the final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction.").
242 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
243 Cf. Eric M. Freedman, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It So: Ex
Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 531, 570 (2000) (characterizing Mar-
bury and Bollman as similar exercises in realpolitik).
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Tobias Watkins was convicted by the Federal Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia-a superior court of general jurisdiction2 "-and
petitioned for a habeas writ from the United States Supreme Court.2 45 He
attached his indictment and the federal judgment to his petition, arguing
that the District charged and convicted him of a crime not punishable in
federal court.2 46 The Supreme Court decided Watkins in 1830, when
there was no writ-of-error review for criminal judgments decided in the
lower federal courts. 247 The appellate relief Watkins sought in the Su-
preme Court was an "original" habeas writ; he did not (and could not)
appeal or seek writ-of-error review of his federal conviction.248
For some of the reasons set forth below, many courts and legal schol-
ars have read Watkins as a rule against habeas review of criminal judg-
2491 he
ments, citing Chief Justice Marshall's English writ history:
[Habeas] is ... known to the common law . . .. It is in the nature of a
writ of error, to examine the legality of the commitment.... To reme-
dy [monarchical excess,] the celebrated [1679 Habeas Corpus Act]
was enacted, for the purpose of securing the benefits for which the
writ was given. This statute may be referred to as describing the cases
in which relief is, in England, afforded by this writ to a person de-
tained in custody. It enforces the common law. This statute excepts
from those who are entitled to its benefit, persons committed for felo-
ny or treason plainly expressed in the warrant, as well as persons con-
victed or in execution.
The exception of persons convicted applies particularly to the ap-
plication now under consideration....
244 See Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 197 ("The circuit court is a court of general criminal
jurisdiction in cases within the local law, and within the law of Maryland."). The term "supe-
rior court" has a separate meaning in this context. An inferior court can only decide a narrow
category of cases that is frequently defined by statute. A superior court, by contrast, has
wide-ranging "general jurisdiction" to decide many different types of cases. See Ann Wool-
handler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 575, 588-89 (1993). For those who subscribe
to the belief that habeas cannot be used to scrutinize a criminal conviction, the prohibition
only extends to custody ordered by superior courts of general jurisdiction. See id. at 590
nn.90-93 and accompanying text.
245 See Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 194.
246 See id. at 194-95.
247 Outside of specialized contexts (for example, capital cases), Congress did not create
general writ-of-error review for federal criminal convictions until 1891. Judiciary Act of
1891, ch. 517, §5, 26 Stat. 826, 827.
248 See Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 201 (excerpted in text accompanying note 259, infra).
249 See supra note 241 (collecting sources).
[Vol. 99:753798
2013] A Constitutional Theory ofHabeas Power 799
. . .The judgment of a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is
as conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this court would
be.250
This passage is rife with mistakes. The English common-law writ did
extend to criminal convictions.2 5 Whatever Chief Justice Marshall
meant when he wrote that the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act "describ[ed] the
cases in which relief is ... afforded by this writ to a person detained in
custody,"252 the 1679 Act did not limit habeas relief to prisoners eligible
for the statutory writ the 1679 Act created.253 The 1679 Act was specifi-
cally targeted at abusive pre-trial detention,2 54 and the common-law writ
remained intact.25 5 Paul Halliday's work shows that eighteenth-century
writs were inscribed to show whether they issued under common law or
statute.256 The 1679 statutory proviso for post-conviction relief appeared
in a section creating a habeas remedy for potential bailees.257 In other
250 Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 202-03.
251 See Bushell's Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1006-07, 1018 (C.P.); (1669)
Vaughan 135, 135-37, 158 (discharging through habeas a juror, sitting for the trial of Wil-
liam Penn and William Mead, criminally sentenced for contempt and by a court of general
jurisdiction); see also Freund, Hayman Brief, supra note 117, at 30 ("[It is maintained that
habeas corpus did not lie on behalf of a prisoner convicted by a court of general criminal ju-
risdiction . . .. [T]he governing criterion is not the Act of 1679, which in fact left cases of
convicted persons to the common-law writ; the writ was in fact available to prisoners con-
victed by a court of general criminal jurisdiction and factual inquiries could be made; and the
developing use of the writ in the Federal courts has not rested on statutory grant but on a
normal exercise of the judicial process.").
252 Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 202 (excerpted in text accompanying note 250, supra).
253 See Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 1, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959,
967 (1965) ("The act provided in great detail for an habeas corpus procedure which plugged
the loopholes and made even the king's bench judges subject to penalties for noncompli-
ance." (emphasis added)).
254 See Meador, supra note 28, at 26; R.J. Sharpe, The Law of Habeas Corpus 19 (2d ed.
1989); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Federal Postconviction Remedies and Relief 60 -61 (1996).
255 See Halliday, supra note 18, at 242 ("[J]udges performed their most innovative work
using the common-law writ, in part because the statute applied only to imprisonment for fel-
on or treason.").
5 See id. at 426 n.105 (explaining that statutory writs were inscribed "per statutum
tricesimo primo Caroli Secundi Regis," as opposed to "per regulam curiam").
257 See Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.) ("Whereas great [delays] have
been used by [sheriffs, jailers] and other officers, to whose Custody any of the Kings Sub-
jects have [been] committed for [criminal] or supposed [criminal matters] in [making returns
of writs] of habeas corpus ... contrary to their Duty and the [known laws] of the Land,
whereby many of the Kings Subjects have been and hereafter may be long detained in Pris-
on, in such Cases where by Law they are [bailable] to their great charge and vexation." (pre-
ambular recital)).
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words, the 1679 Act made the statutory writ unavailable to criminally-
convicted prisoners because that particular provision set forth rules for
bail, not because judges otherwise lacked habeas power to scrutinize a
criminal judgment.
1. Watkins's Analytic Entanglements
During the nineteenth century, federal courts parroted a notional rule
against post-conviction review because it became entangled with two
other features of American habeas law: (1) whether the Supreme Court
should use its "original" habeas authority to conduct ordinary appellate
review (Watkins was a question about the propriety of a Supreme Court
habeas writ); and (2) whether one sovereign can conduct habeas review
of another sovereign's custody (Watkins also involved federal review of
federal custody). I touch on each feature with detail sufficient only to re-
late it to the Habeas Power Theory I tender here.
First, observers (and judges) consistently confused limits on the Su-
preme Court's Article III appellate jurisdiction with limits on Article III
judicial power common to all federal courts.258 Watkins was at least as
much about the former as it was the latter. This distinction is evident on
the opinion's face:
This application is made to [the Supreme Court] which has no ju-
risdiction in criminal cases; which could not revise this judgment;
could not reverse or affirm it, were the record brought up directly by
writ of error. The power, however, to award writs of habeas cor-
pus . . . has been repeatedly exercised. No doubt exists respecting the
power; the question is, whether this be a case in which it ought to be
exercised.259
For most of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court lacked con-
ventional appellate jurisdiction over federal criminal convictions.260 In
stead, the Court combined its original habeas power (bringing up the
258 See infra note 263 (collecting sources and explaining the implications of this confu-
Sion.
25 Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 201 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
260 See Dallin H. Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962
Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 177-79. Under the 1789 Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court could issue
writs of error only in civil cases. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84;
United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 170-71 (1805). Congress added a right of ap-
peal in admiralty and equity in 1803. See Act of March 3, 1803, ch. 40, § 2, 2 Stat. 244.
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prisoner) with the common-law certiorari power (bringing up the record)
to achieve the functional equivalent of direct review.261 Watkins was the
first in a series of cases, with similar boilerplate, urging restraint in the
exercise of this particular form of appellate power.262 The fact that these
decisions were almost invariably announced in the combined habeas-
certiorari posture makes it impossible to isolate conclusively the Su-
preme Court's early treatment of habeas jurisdiction common to all Arti-
cle III tribunals, 263 especially because many contemporaneous decisions
did conduct some habeas review of due process questions.264 By the time
261 See, e.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 163-64 (1873) (relying on combina-
tion of original habeas writ and common-law certiorari petition); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 75 (1807) (same); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 448 (1806) (same).
262 See, e.g., Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 420-21 (1885) ("[Hlaving no jurisdiction of
criminal cases by writ of error or appeal, [the Court] cannot discharge on habeas corpus a
person imprisoned under the sentence of a Circuit or District Court in a criminal case, unless
the sentence exceeds the jurisdiction of that court, or there is no authority to hold him under
the sentence."); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 653-54 (1884) ("[T]his court has no
general authority to review on error or appeal the judgments of the Circuit Courts. .. in cas-
es within their criminal jurisdiction .. . . [I]f that court [which passed the sentence] had ju-
risdiction ... this court can inquire no further."); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 203
("We have no power to examine the proceedings on a writ of error, and it would be strange,
if, under colour of a writ to liberate an individual from unlawful imprisonment, we could
substantially reverse a judgment which the law has placed beyond our control."); Ex parte
Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38, 42 (1822) ("[T]his Court has no appellate jurisdiction con-
fided to it in criminal cases ... . If, then, this Court cannot directly revise a judgment of the
Circuit Court in a criminal case, what reason is there to suppose, that it was intended to vest
it with the authority to do it indirectly?").
263 Cf. Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 579, 612 (1982) ("Given the special limitation on the Supreme Court's appellate ju-
risdiction in criminal cases until 1886, each case from that period on which Bator relies to
demonstrate the narrow scope of habeas review can be read alternatively to reflect the Su-
preme Court's view that its lack of appellate jurisdiction prevented exercise of habeas juris-
diction."). I do not agree with Professor Peller's statement that each case decision can be
characterized purely as an appellate rule. The relevant Supreme Court opinions contain pas-
sages for which isolation of the limits on appellate jurisdiction and limits on habeas jurisdic-
tion is difficult. See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 374-77 (1879) (hedging as to
whether putative rule barring habeas review of criminal convictions is a feature of limited
appellate or limited habeas power). I have already argued extensively that, in original writ
cases, the Supreme Court has historically evaded the distinction between its own lack of ap-
pellate power and an absence of original power common to all Article III courts. See Lee
Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 Va. L. Rev. 61, 68-73 (2011). Nonetheless, there is
considerable evidence that lower federal courts were unrestricted by Article III, § 2 con-
straints on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., In re McDonald, 16 F.
Cas. 17, 27 (E.D. Mo. 1861) (No. 8751) ("No question was made as to the power and effi-
ciency of the writ, or as to the jurisdiction of any court not restricted by the constitution to
the exercise of appellate power.").
264 See infra note 270.
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the Supreme Court reviewed federal criminal judgments using more fa-
miliar types of appellate jurisdiction, the ambiguous language had crept
into some habeas decisions that had nothing to do with appellate pow-
er.
265
Second, Chief Justice Marshall's Watkins opinion is bound up in a
debate over federal habeas review of state convictions, with the major
positions on the relevant nineteenth-century cases staked out by Profes-
sor Paul Bator and Professor Gary Peller.266 For Professor Bator, Wat-
kins and its progeny expressed the principle that habeas was not used to
scrutinize the lawfulness of a criminal judgment issued by a jurisdiction-
ally "competent" court. 267 For Professor Peller, those cases did not re-
flect a limited habeas remedy so much as a narrow due process right.268
Law professors have felled forests in this dispute, but I do not want to
tread unnecessarily on the question. Each camp has made serious mis-
takes in its characterization of English common law and nineteenth-
265 To its credit, the Supreme Court was sometimes careful to delineate this distinction. In
1879, the Supreme Court decided Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, which addressed statutory limits on
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, id. at 374-75, but expressly distinguished those
limits from those that "aris[e] from the nature and objects of the writ itself." Id. at 375. The
Court stated that the general rule was that a criminal judgment was sufficient to prove law-
fulness, but then made an extraordinarily important caveat: "The only ground on
which . . . any court, without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas
corpus to a prisoner under conviction ... is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the
person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void." Id. Two ideas
from that caveat merit emphasis. First, the Supreme Court stated explicitly that it did not
need statutory authorization to conduct habeas review of a criminal conviction. Second, the
Court identified an absence ofjurisdiction as one example of a void proceeding. Siebold, in
fact, carefully emphasized the common-law origins of the rule and of the source of judicial-
ly-created exceptions to it. See id. at 376-77.
266 See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Pris-
oners, 76 Hary. L. Rev. 441, 466 (1963) (describing Watkins as "the great case" showing that
inmates could not relitigate "substantive error" in a habeas proceeding); Peller, supra note
263, at 604-05 (critiquing Professor Bator's reliance on Watkins). The debate between Pro-
fessor Bator and Professor Peller is treated by the leading habeas treatise as the defining de-
bate in the field of post-conviction review. See 1 Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal
Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 2.4(c), at 40 (6th ed. 2011) (describing the theses of
Professors Bator and Peller as "dominat[ing] recent judicial opinions and scholarship").
267 See Bator, supra note 266, at 466 ("The principle [from Watkins] is clear: substantive
error on the part of a court of competent jurisdiction does not render a detention 'illegal' for
purposes of habeas corpus . . . .").
268 See Peller, supra note 263, at 663 ("[Bly not distinguishing between the scope of habe-
as review and the requirements of the due process clause, [Professor Bator's] analysis con-
sistently mistakes the narrow view of due process for a narrow view of habeas jurisdic-
tion.").
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century habeas cases. For example, Professor Bator repeats a mistake
that Chief Justice Marshall committed in Watkins-both erroneously
emphasized the English statutory habeas writ.2 69 Professor Bator also ig-
nores habeas decisions memorializing more than strict inquiries into "ju-
risdiction." 27 0 Professor Peller's argument-that habeas remedies were
unavailable only because there was a thin due process right-glosses
over inconsistent nineteenth-century cases treating a criminal judgment
from a jurisdictionally-competent court as dispositive evidence of law-
fulness.27 1 Moreover, Professor Peller's thesis is inconsistent with the
nineteenth-century availability of direct appellate relief on claims for
which the Court foreclosed habeas relief.27 2 To generalize somewhat,
Professor Peller incorrectly theorized that the presence of a criminal
judgment did not restrict the habeas remedy, and Professor Bator incor-
rectly characterized those limits as jurisdictional bars to habeas relief.
2. Reconciling the Habeas Post-Conviction Cases
These two entanglements notwithstanding, there is language in Wat-
kins pertinent to any collateral review of a criminal conviction: "An im-
prisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment
be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has general ju-
risdiction of the subject, although it should be erroneous." 27 3 The best
269 See Bator, supra note 266, at 466 & n.51 (emphasizing Watkins and the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679).
270 See, e.g., Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123, 129 (1906) (speaking largely in jurisdictional
language, but holding that the prisoner "was not deprived of his liberty without due process
of law by the manner in which he was tried, so as to violate the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution"); Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 402-04 (1900)
(suggesting that habeas relief should not issue if a conviction "involves no question of due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment"); Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 86,
91-95 (1890) (reaching a Fourteenth Amendment question pursuant to federal habeas juris-
diction); Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 184 (1889) (presenting habeas as a remedy for an
unlawful conviction that is an "invasion of a constitutional right").
271 See, e.g., Siebold, 100 U.S. at 375 ("The only ground on which this court, or any court,
without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner
under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over
theperson or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void.")
2 See 1 Hertz & Liebman, supra note 266, at 44-45.
273 Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 203; see also id. at 201 (emphasizing that "[n]o doubt exists
respecting the power [to grant writs of habeas corpus]" and that "the question is, wheth-
er ... it ought to be exercised"). Justice Marshall, however, seemed to cloud this statement
with subsequent language suggesting that the "law" did not invest the Court with the power
to revise criminal judgments through habeas. See id. at 207 ("The judgment . .. is of itself
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way reconcile the reality of restricted relief with robust judicial power is
to conceptualize limited post-conviction review as a nonjurisdictional
rule imposed by judges. The Supreme Court retains ultimate authority to
determine what features of a criminal judgment show that the resulting
custody is lawful. Federal courts may deny habeas relief on the ground
that a conviction proves the lawfulness of custody, but judges-not
Congress-make that decision. Treating the post-conviction rule as a
prudential phenomenon is consistent with English common-law habeas
power. The fact that a prisoner was confined by a jurisdictionally-
competent court did not defeat the power of another English court to
consider the lawfulness of the custody, although a criminal judgment
was generally dispositive as an evidentiary matter.27 4
C. Implications for Modern Detention
Boumediene reasons that a custodial outcome must be subject to ha-
beas scrutiny inversely proportional to the legal process that produced
it.275 The Supreme Court seems to affirm the following logic: that Arti-
cle III creates the power to do the sorts of things that courts do in order
to issue habeas relief;276 that one of those things involves the inherent
authority of an Article III judge to decide whether the process involved
in the custody disposition was lawful;27 7 and that Congress is forbidden
from substituting an inadequate form of relief for habeas process.2 78 The
evidence of its own legality, and requires for its support no inspection of the indictments on
which it is founded. The law trusts that court with the whole subject, and has not confided to
this court the power of revising its decisions [using habeas corpus]. .. . The judgment in-
forms us that the commitment is legal, and with that information it is our duty to be satis-
fied."). This language does not specify whether the Court lacks power to "revise" the judg-
ment because it lacks appellate power to do so, or because "the law" must authorize any
collateral review of criminal judgments.
274 See supra text accompanying notes 46 -52.
275 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 781-83.
276 See id. at 779 (describing what the Constitution requires as a power ofjudges).
277 See id. (holding that habeas power includes judicial authority to hear arguments on the
lawfulness of detention and order discharge); see also id. at 783 ("The habeas court must
have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the cause for detention and
the Executive's power to detain."); id. at 787 ("[W]hen the judicial power to issue habeas
corpus properly is invoked[,] the judicial officer must have adequate authority to make a de-
termination in light of the relevant law and facts and to formulate and issue appropriate or-
ders for relief, including, if necessary, an order directing the prisoner's release.").
278 See id. at 786 (phrasing the constitutional requirement as whether "the writ of habeas
corpus, or its substitute, [can] function as an effective and proper remedy"); id. at 732-33
(holding Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7 unconstitutional because it took habeas au-
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proposition that the Federal Constitution guarantees habeas access for
criminally-convicted federal inmates no longer occupies a grey area;
modem case law now aligns with the English writ's historical office.
1. The Federal Post-Conviction Power
Boumediene formally involved legislative restrictions on relief for
GTMO detainees, but its logic goes beyond military custody. To be sure,
Boumediene embraces (at the very least) the idea that the effective
standard for habeas review should vary with respect to the custodial
form at issue. Whatever the variation, however, it should be expressed in
non-jurisdictional terms.
First, as a matter of historical practice, "habeas" did not mean one
thing for executive detention, another thing for an immigration proceed-
ing, another thing for pretrial detention, and another thing for post-
conviction challenges.27 9 Habeas proceedings may have produced differ-
ent results that varied by custodial category, but that variation can repre-
sent variation in the substantive authority to detain prisoners,8 variation
in the substantive rights the different categories of prisoners enjoyed,28 1
and variation in the evidentiary presumption of lawfulness afforded to
categories of detention that were products of more judicial process.28 2 In
other words, we need not alter the outcomes of our major habeas cases
to acknowledge the remedial principle that judges retain power to decide
lawfulness.
thority that was constitutionally required away); see also id. at 785 ("Even when the proce-
dures authorizing detention are structurally sound, the Suspension Clause remains applicable
and the writ relevant.").
279 See id. at 779-81 (articulating a habeas rule across various custody sources that judges
had the power to inquire into the legality of detention).
280 Compare, e.g., Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 662 (1892) ("A writ of habeas cor-
pus ... is to ascertain whether the prisoner can lawfully be detained in custody; and if suffi-
cient ground for his detention by the government is shown, he is not to be discharged for de-
fects in the original arrest or commitment."), with id. at 660 ("As to [noncitizens seeking
entry to the United States] the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within
powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.").
281 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 524 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality opin-
ion) ("Even in cases in which the detention of enemy combatants is legally authorized, there
remains the question of what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes his en-
emy-combatant status." (emphasis added)).
2 2 Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 781-82 (contrasting review where convictions are availa-
ble and where they are not).
2013] 805
Virginia Law Review
Second, the idea that there are separate remedial rules for different
types of custody appears flatly inconsistent with Boumediene itself. The
Court dedicates a considerable amount of space to the discussion that the
amount of "deference" courts should show to a custody order is inverse-
ly proportional to the amount of process that produced it.283 In establish-
ing this proposition for GTMO detainees, Boumediene cites to no fewer
than ten post-conviction cases.284 Moreover, in announcing the rule that
a remedy's adequacy and effectiveness are necessary to show constitu-
tionality, the Court incorporated its ruling from two prior federal post-
conviction cases in which it held that adequacy and effectiveness are
sufficient to show constitutionality.28 5
Third, I want to acknowledge the practical objection that Congress,
not the courts, should determine the scope of detention authority. A ha-
beas power need not trench on the prerogatives of the coordinate
branches. The other two branches can still authorize detention pursuant
to whatever power the constitution allocates to them; habeas power
means only that a federal jailor must release the prisoner if the underly-
ing custody is unlawful.286 In other words, the political branches can still
decide what custody is authorized and what custody is not, but they can-
not effectuate unlawful custody by removing the habeas remedy.
283 See id.
284 See id. at 780-87 (citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) (opinion of Frankfur-
ter, J.); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346
(1915); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1886); Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 209; Ex
parte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 969, 971 (S.D. Ohio 1855) (No. 11,935); Ex parte Pattison, 56
Miss. 161, 164 (1878); Ex parte Foster, 5 Tex. Ct. App. 625, 644 (1879)). In passing, the
Court contrasts GTMO detention with state post-conviction review, and states that "[h]ere,
[the] opportunity [to introduce exculpatory evidence] is constitutionally required."
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786.
285 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785 ("[The Suspension Clause remains applicable and
relevant], as Hayman and Swain make clear, even where the prisoner is detained after a
criminal trial conducted in full accordance with the protections of the Bill of Rights. Were
this not the case, there would have been no reason for the Court to inquire into the adequacy
of substitute habeas procedures in Hayman and Swain. That the prisoners were detained pur-
suant to the most rigorous proceedings imaginable, a full criminal trial, would have been
enough to render any habeas substitute acceptable per se.").
286 To be clear, Congress can continue to authorize detention to the maximum amount al-
lowable under federal statutes and the Constitution. The only difference is that, because of
the habeas power, Congress could not take away a habeas remedy for unlawful custody.
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2. Examples of Unconstitutional Restrictions on Federal Post-
Conviction Review
What are the practical consequences of explicitly recognizing a dura-
bly-vested Article III habeas power to decide the lawfulness of federal
custody? In this Subsection, I want to discuss several congressional re-
strictions that would be more difficult to justify under such a theory than
under prevailing paradigms for writ process. First, the one-year statute
of limitations applicable to post-conviction claims of federal inmates is
probably unconstitutional.2 87 Statutes of limitations are sometimes con-
sidered part of the entitlement to which they apply.2 88 That linkage,
however, is almost beside the point-if a legislative rule is generally
used to restrict relief and is not meant to streamline process, then the
paradigm advanced here would lead to the conclusion that legislative
rule is unconstitutional. The idea of a judicially imposed timeliness rule
is nothing unusual, as pre-Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA") decisional law used an equitable laches rule for post-
conviction petitions.28 9 Even post-AEDPA decisional law functionally
vests judges with timeliness decisions, as the Supreme Court has read an
equitable tolling rule into the limitations statute.290
Second, legislative rules against "successive" and "abusive" claims,
along the lines of those appearing in 28 U.S.C. Section 2255(h), would
also be constitutionally problematic. "Successive" claims are challenges
287 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2006).
288 m rake this observation primarily based on the "Erie" cases in which a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the limitations period that the state court in
which the district court sits would apply. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110
(1945). But see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) ("The historical record
shows conclusively, we think, that the society which adopted the Constitution did not regard
statutes of limitations as substantive provisions, akin to the rules governing the validity and
effect of contracts, but rather as procedural restrictions fashioned by each jurisdiction for its
own courts.").
289 See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 n.1 (2006); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 advisory committee note (1976) (Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts) ("[Rule 9(a)] is not a statute of limitations. Rather, the limitation is
based on the equitable doctrine of laches.").
290 See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010). Holland involved the limitations
period for state prisoners in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006), but the limitations period for federal
prisoners is virtually identical. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). In cases where the federal govern-
ment does not assert a statute of limitations defense, however, no equitable tolling question
arises. See Day, 547 U.S. at 204 n.3.
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presented in some previous petitions,2 9' and "abusive" claims are new
challenges not presented in a prior federal proceeding.2 92 Section 2255
categorically bars successive claims and, with limited exceptions, also
prohibits abusive ones. 293 These abusive-claim rules dramatically curtail
relief, often leaving prisoners unable to litigate challenges that potential-
ly accrue upon the announcement of a new decision or discovery of new
facts. These rules are not semantic requirements about the form of a fil-
ing. And, as with the statute of limitations, the pre-AEDPA decisional
law had dealt with abusive and successive claims quite well, having
fashioned fairly clear rules about the criteria for judges to grant relief on
the pertinent claims.294 So, when the Supreme Court reasons that statuto-
ry abuse-of-the-writ restrictions are constitutional because the provision
resembles the judge made rule,295 it misses the entire point. The judicial-
ly created restriction is constitutional not because its content is accepta-
ble, but because judges created it.
Third, under a habeas power paradigm, any interpretation of the post-
conviction statute that affords dispositive weight to a jurisdictionally
sound federal criminal conviction would be unconstitutional. (There is
no such rule now, although many federal restrictions proceed from a
greater-includes-the-lesser notion that such a restriction might be consti-
tutionally permissible.) 296 In other words, the Article III habeas power
includes the authority to look "inside" a conviction to assess custody in
light of the procedure that secured it. Certainly, as Boumediene
acknowledges, where there is evidence of criminal process, the custodial
291 There is no federal provision even discussing a successive claim, although the structure
of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which does include certain exceptions for abusive claims, strongly sug-
gests that relief in such cases is categorically unavailable. The analogous rule for state pris-
oners expressly forecloses relief for successive claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).
292 The term "abusive claim" is therefore pejorative; a claim that is asserted for the first
time in a subsequent habeas petition need not be "abusive" in the everyday sense.
293 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)-(h)(2) (specifying "new rule" and "new evidence" excep-
tions to abusive-claim rule). Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)-the analogous provision for state
prisoners-§ 2255 contains no express bar on claims presented in a previous petition, but
there is no judicial authority indicating such an omission should be interpreted as a grant of
jurisdiction to entertain such claims.
294 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318-19 (1995); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,
338 (1992); cf. 2 Hertz & Liebman, supra note 266, at § 28.3, at 1572-1632 (tracing the evo-
lution of the law governing claims subject to the abuse-of-the-writ defense); id. at 1632-53
(tracing the evolution of the law governing successive claims).
295 See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (assessing the statutory rule
against the history of the judge-made rule).
296 See supra Section II.B.
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order is far more persuasive evidence of lawfulness than is an order
where such process is lacking.297 If there is an Article III habeas power,
then judges must determine the degree of presumptive weight to afford
such an order. That conclusion is consistent with the power that judges
could exercise at common law.29 8 Boumediene supports the idea that the
power would include an ability to look inside a federal conviction; the
case upon which Boumediene's Suspension Clause holding rests (United
States v. Hayman) involved a claim that federal criminal trial counsel
was constitutionally ineffective.2 9 9 The counterargument, that Congress
can freely restrict post-conviction review because the Federal Constitu-
tion guarantees no post-conviction access at all, is an idea that crept into
Supreme Court decisions after the founding.3 00 Those decisions, howev-
er, can be reconciled with the modem state of habeas law under the theo-
ry of Article III power I propound here.
D. The State Prisoner Question
My Habeas Power Theory is inconclusive as to federal relief for state
prisoners. As Subsection III.B.1 mentions, the degree to which Article
III courts may conduct habeas review of state custody is the subject of
intense dispute both on the bench and in the academy.301 Part of that dis-
cussion certainly involves how habeas interacts with criminal custody,
but it also implicates broader questions about what sovereign comity re-
quires.
In short, I do not believe that Article III in and of itself vests a judicial
power to assess the lawfulness of state custody. If the Federal Constitu-
tion requires federal habeas access for state prisoners, then it does so
pursuant to some combination of Article III, the Suspension Clause, and
another constitutional provision-such as the Supremacy Clause or the
297 See supra Section III.A, and supra notes 283 -85 and accompanying text.
298 See supra Part I.
299 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 208 (1952) (cited in Boumediene, 553 U.S.
at 774-75). Treating Hayman as the source of a constitutional rule of adequacy and effec-
tiveness would seem strange if the ability to present the underlying claim in Hayman-a
claim that went to the procedural integrity of the decision-was not within the Suspension
Clause guarantee. See also Neuman, supra note 6, at 554 (observing more generally that the
issue in Hayman was "worth recalling" in light of Boumediene's reliance on it).
300 See supra Section III.B.
301 See supra notes 258-72 and accompanying text.
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Civil War Amendments. 302 Those combinations are certainly plausible
accounts of habeas law, but they are beyond this paper's scope.
CONCLUSION
Habeas law remains addled by legislation, decisional law, and aca-
demic theory that have ruptured any contemporary link to the English
common-law writ. The modem literature suggests that the availability of
habeas process is contingent upon, among other things: the distribution
of Article III judicial power between the Supreme Court and lower fed-
eral tribunals; the type of custody that is subject to habeas scrutiny; the
procedural protections afforded in the original custodial commitment;
and varied policy priorities associated with either public safety or na-
tional emergencies.
Habeas power theory represents my attempt to unify the various
threads of habeas law, in a way that is consistent with established max-
ims of federal jurisdiction. The key to cohering the pertinent law is to
analyze habeas less as an individual right and more as a judicial power.
A theory deriving from Article III and the Suspension Clause is surpris-
ingly simple: in the absence of formal suspension, a federal judge has
judicial power to decide the lawfulness of federal custody. Congress re-
tains the ability to set the substantive parameters of federal detention,
but cannot strip judges of power to award a federal habeas remedy in the
event that custody is unlawful.
302 For an argument that Article III combines with the Supremacy Clause to ensure some
sort of state-prisoner habeas review, see James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Ef-
fectual Power": The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts,
98 Colum. L. Rev. 696, 850-84 (1998). For an argument that the Due Process Clause incor-
porates the Suspension Clause against the states, see Steiker, supra note 116, at 866-68.
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